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THE ETHICS OF MIDDLE-CLASS ACCESS TO
LEGAL SERVICES AND WHAT WE CAN
LEARN FROM THE MEDICAL PROFESSION'S
SHWI? TO A CORPORATE PARADIGM
George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran**
"All professions are conspiracies against the laity."'
INTRODUCTION

Broadcast in August 1977, a thirty-second advertisement for
Jacoby & Meyers featured a balding actor who portrayed a middleaged, middle-class man concerned about the cost of hiring a lawyer.
"If you've got a legal problem and you're rich, you can afford an
attorney," the actor says. "If you're poor, you get legal aid. But if
you're in the middle, you should know about... Jacoby & Meyers."
The commercial sums up the common image of the middle-class
consumers' place in the American legal services market: ineligible for
public assistance and unable or unwilling to pay exorbitant lawyer's
fees, they are left out in the cold to fend for themselves.
Recent empirical surveys by bar associations tend to confirm that
middle-class Americans often lack access to affordable legal services.
These studies suggest that, more often than not, "ordinary" people
with a need for legal services go without. Consistent with these
studies, legal industry statistics show a continuing and dramatic shift in
the allocation of legal services from individuals to corporate business
interests.
The American legal community has recently engaged in a heated
debate over the continuing wisdom of ethical rules that prohibit
lawyers from sharing fees with non-lawyers and participating in
multidisciplinary practices ("MDPs") with other professionals or nonprofessionals. That debate has usually focused on the efforts of large
accounting firms to expand their role in providing legal services and
Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. J.D., 1982, Yale Law School:
M.A.T., 1977, Brown University; B.A., 1974, Yale College.
J.D. Candidate, 2002, Cornell Law School- B.A.. 1991, St Patrick's College.
1. George Bernard Shaw, The Doctor's Dilemma, in I Bernard Shaw: Complete
Plays with Prefaces 110 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1963) (1906).
2. See Mike France, Legal Clinics:Lights Go Out for Storefronts, Nat'l LJ., Dec.
12, 1994, at Al.
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on the needs of large, often multinational, businesses for integrated
professional services. Mostly lost, though sometimes surfacing in the
MDP dialogue, are the unmet needs of middle-class legal consumers.
Advocacy groups representing the interests of middle-class consumers
have been consistent supporters of the MDP concept. They contend
that relaxation of the ethical rules prohibiting lawyers from sharing
fees with non-lawyers would allow for more efficient and affordable
packaging of services typically needed by middle-class consumers in
areas such as real estate transactions, matrimonial and child custody
disputes, financial and estate planning, employment contracts and
disputes, and small business contracts and disputes.
Opponents of deregulating the ownership structure of legal service
providers argue, on the other hand, that complete lawyer ownership
and control of legal service providers is necessary to preserve lawyers'
independent professional judgment on behalf of clients. The ethical
prohibition on lawyers partnering with non-lawyers or providing legal
services through businesses owned, even in part, by non-lawyers is a
prophylactic rule necessary, they maintain, to protect this
independence and the "core values" of the legal profession, including
confidentiality, loyalty to clients, and avoidance of conflicts of
interest.
While MDP proponents argue that the "core values" of the legal
profession can be protected without the current prohibitions, most
would stop considerably short of a radical opening of the legal services
marketplace. A proposal of the recent American Bar Association
("ABA") MDP Commission, for example, would not have allowed
passive investment in legal service providers. Commentators have
labeled this residual resistance to complete deregulation and the
inevitable, resulting advent of corporate legal service providers as the
"fear of Sears."3
But why not Sears? If the traditional business structure of legal
practice has not met the legal service needs of most Americans, why
not give corporate America an opportunity to do so? Could and
would banks and other financial service providers, for example, be
able to package legal services with financial services in a way that
made them more affordable and more readily available to middleclass Americans? Could access to capital investments allow for better
integration of legal and non-legal services and better use of
technology to streamline and, therefore, reduce the cost of those
services? More fundamentally, could deregulation of the ownership
structure of legal service providers help to create a competitive legal
3. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A
Proposal for NonLawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1998)
(discussing the "fear of Sears" syndrome); see also Bernard Sharfman, Note,
Modifying Model Rule 5.4 to Allow for Minority Ownership of Law Firms by
Nonlawyers, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 477, 481 (2000) (same).
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services market that would fill the current market void for affordable
middle-class legal service?
Whether in the form of simple partnerships between lawyers and
other professionals or the specter of corporate legal service providers,
our current response as a profession has been to shut the door with an
unequivocal "No" to any deregulation of the ownership structure of
legal service providers. While some state bar associations continue to
explore possible amendments to the rules prohibiting sharing of fees
with non-lawyers, the ABA House of Delegates in July of 2000 flatly
rejected the reform proposals of its MDP Commission. We will not,
the MDP opponents say, let the marketplace experiment with our
"core values" or put us in a position where our "independence of
professional judgment" might be compromised. Or, as proponents
we will not let
might cynically recharacterize that response:
competition from non-lawyer providers of legal services erode our
monopoly profits.
As a point of comparison, the medical profession has faced, and
continues to struggle with, similar tensions between affordability and
professionalism and had at one time parallel prohibitions on corporate
ownership of medical service providers. In response to a perceived
crisis in the cost of medical care, and with the help of a Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") ruling that the ban on corporate ownership was
a violation of antitrust laws, the medical profession has moved quickly
from a traditional model of fee-for-service by independent doctors to
the currently predominant model of managed care by corporate
medical service providers that employ physicians. The current
American Medical Association ("AMA") ethical code addresses
extensively a physician's professional responsibilities in the face of
profit pressures from managed care providers but has no prohibition
of any kind on the ownership or business structure of those providers.
The fee-for-service model, like traditional law practice, provides
maximum protection for independent professional judgment on behalf
of clients. This model, particularly in the absence of a competitive
market, is not, however, without its own inherent conflict between the
interests of the consumer and the professional. The danger is not of
under-service or compromised quality of service, but of over-service
and escalating cost: the more medical or legal services provided, the
greater the professional fees in the fee-for-service regime. Managed
care, on the other hand, like MDP or non-lawyer ownership of legal
service providers, presents the risk of professional care decisions
motivated by profit guidelines dictated to professional employees by
business managers. Well-publicized cases of failure to provide needed
care against a doctor's advice with sometimes fatal results have put
the spotlight on this risk and fueled public concern over patients'
rights.
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Corporate medical care providers are, however, apparently here to
stay. Containment of medical costs is considered too essential to the
affordability of medical insurance plans to abandon altogether the
new model. We are willing to manage the tension between
professional independence of judgment and the profit-motivated
business of providing medical services because the alternative is outof-control medical costs.
One might conclude that the abuses by corporate providers of
medical care should be a warning and a lesson to those who would
open the legal services marketplace. The crisis of affordability for
legal services is not so great, one might argue, to justify opening this
Pandora's box. But, when as much as 80% of the legal needs of
ordinary consumers are going unmet according to bar association
surveys, why is the lack of affordable legal services any less critical
than the rising cost of medical care? If the medical profession can
tolerate and manage the tension between professional independence
of judgment and commerce to control cost when the health and lives
of patients may depend on that judgment, why is the legal profession
unwilling to tolerate and manage that same tension when only money
or legal rights are at stake? Is it truly better to have no legal service
than the legal side of Sears? Can this ethical tension be managed, as it
is now in the medical profession, through professional standards or
liability rules or some combination of the two?
Part I of this article briefly reviews the history of the prohibition on
non-lawyer ownership of legal service providers and the current MDP
debate. Part II reviews the existing empirical research on provision of
legal service to middle-class consumers and discusses how the
continuing prohibition on non-lawyer ownership of legal service
providers may be a significant barrier to expanding service to those
consumers. Part III describes the strikingly similar history of the
medical profession's parallel prohibition on non-professional
ownership and its ultimate demise in the face of out-of-control costs.
Part IV describes how medical ethics rules and liability standards have
attempted to address the problem of preserving professional
independence of judgment in the face of profit pressures from
corporate providers of medical services. Part V discusses how the
medical model may provide directions for managing the ethical
conflicts created by relaxing or abandoning the prohibition on nonlawyer ownership of legal service providers.
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE PROHIBITION ON NON-LAWYER
OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE "MDP" DEBATE

A. Originsof the Prohibition

When the ABA drafted its first ethics code in 1908, it did not
prohibit lawyers from partnering with non-lawyers, or from sharing
fees with non-lawyers.4 Nineteenth-century state ethics codes, the
forerunners to the 1908 Canons, were also silent on the subject.'
In 1928, the ABA adopted Canons 33, 34, and 35,6 which codified
then recent opinions of the ABA ethics committee.7 Couched in
precatory language, Canon 33 prohibited partnerships between
lawyers and non-lawyers;8 Canon 34 prohibited fee-splitting between
lawyers and non-lawyers;9 and Canon 35 prohibited lawyers from
being employed by a corporation or other organization to render legal
services to others. 10

The official reports give little justification for the new canons." The
minority report of one committee member stated that while "there is
4. ABA Opinions of the Committee on Prof'l Ethics 1 (1967) (indicating Canon
34, which prohibited lawyers from partnering with non-lawyers was not adopted until
1928, twenty years after the original canons were adopted).
5. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on MAultidisciplinar"
Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implicationsfor ie Core
Values Debate, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1115, 1116 (2000).
6. See Canons of Prof'l Ethics, Canons 33-35 (1928).
7. See Canons 33-35; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 8 (1925). Formal Opinion 8 concerned the propriety of a lawyer's employment
with an automobile association that provided legal services to its members. See id.
Opinion 10 dealt with the ethical implications of a lawyer-trust officer employed by a
bank, representing that bank in proceedings involving the bank as trustee for minor
heirs. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10 (1926).
8. See Canon 33 ("Partnerships between lawyers and members of other
professions or non-professional persons should not be formed or permitted where any
part of the partnership's employments consists of the practice of law.").
9. See Canon 34 ("No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.").
10. Canon 35 states:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client
and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He
should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in
the interest of such intermediary.
Canon 35.
11. One of the Formal Opinions relied on for the codification, however, provided
an "independent judgment" rationale. See Formal Op. 10. supra note 7. Opinion 10
proscribed a salaried lawyer-trust officer from representing a client in a trust
proceeding. See id. The Committee on Professional Ethics opined as follows:
As an employee his only duty is to his employer. As a lawyer he owes a duty
to the Court and to the public, as well as to his client. Can he consisticutly
act in these dual capacities at one and the same time? Being dependent on
his employer's pleasure for his livelihood, can he properly observe that
independence of judgment and action that are indispensable to the advocate
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nothing inherently 'unethical' in the formation of partnerships
between lawyers engaged in certain kinds of work and ... some other

form of expert," he was supporting the provisions "[a]s a matter of
professional policy."' 2 Adoption of the new canons apparently was
not without controversy and dissent. The drafting committee noted
that "there is substantial difference of view in the profession
respecting its recommendations as to partnerships, division of fees,
intermediaries, and the bonding of lawyers,"' 3 and that these
differences were "radical and irreconcilable." 4
According to a recent study by Professor Bruce Green, the primary
motivation for the adoption of the prohibitions was economic
protectionism. 5
"[B]ar leaders... acknowledge[d] that their
motivation was primarily to protect lawyers' livelihood."' 6 They
responded, in particular, to competition from corporations that were
providing legal services. As one commentator noted in 1931, "[t]itle,
insurance, trust, indemnity, collection and other corporations are
spreading their tentacles over large segments of the lawyer's domain.
It has been estimated that corporations to-day perform 60 per cent of
corporate law work."' 7

Indeed, according to Professor Green, the ethical prohibitions
adopted by the ABA in the new 1928 canons had their origins in a
1909 New York law making it a misdemeanor for a corporation to
"render or furnish legal services or advice, or to furnish attorneys or
counsel or to render legal services of any kind."' 8 At that time,
corporations employed lawyers to represent third parties in litigation
and were not subject to the ethical prohibitions on lawyer
advertising. 9 This led members of the New York bar to seek
protection from the legislature from what they considered unfair
competition. °

in court? ...He must be free to exercise his independent judgment as an
attorney for the benefit of the interests he represents, which he could not be
expected to do while under the domination of a third party as its salaried
servant.
Id.
12. Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who
Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 Hastings L.J. 577, 586 (1989) (quoting 52

Rep. of the A.B.A. 378 (1927)).
13. Id. (quoting Minority Report of F. W. Grinnel, 52 Rep. of the A.B.A. 378

(1927)).
14. Green, supra note 5, at 1139 (quoting Proposed Supplements to Canons of
ProfessionalEthics, 13 A.B.A. J. 268 (1927)).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1135.
I. Maurice Wormser, Frankenstein Incorporated 164 (1931).
N.Y. Penal Law § 280 (1909); see Green, supra note 5, at 1120.
See Green, supra note 5, at 1119-20.
See id. at 1120.
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When the New York statute was challenged in the courts,2' the
chairman of the Brooklyn Bar Association's Committee on
Grievances argued in the petitioner's brief in the New York Court of
Appeals that competition from a corporation "is disadvantageous and
unfair to me as a practising member of the bar of this state and others
similarly situated." 22 Another prominent supporter of the bill argued
in a brief on behalf of the Attorney General that the law was "of
special importance to young men, ambitious to become lawyers
through the methods prescribed by existing laws and to those who
have obtained the necessary license and have taken up the practice as
a profession."' In upholding the statute in 1910, the New York Court
of Appeals, however, emphasized not protection of lawyers but
protection of clients' interests and lawyers' independence of
professional judgment in serving those interests. The court reasoned:
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a
limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and
confidence. It cannot be delegated without consent and it cannot
exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to practice law
for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would be subject to the
directions of the corporation and not to the directions of the client.
There would be neither contract nor privity between him and the
client, and he would not owe even the duty of counsel to the actual
litigant. The corporation would control the litigation, the money
earned would belong to the corporation and the attorney would be
responsible to the corporation only. His master would not be the
client but the corporation, conducted it may be wholly by laymen,
organized simply to make money and not to aid in the
administration of justice
which is the highest function of an attorney
24
and counselor at law.
When the ABA Special Committee on Supplementing the Canons
of Professional Ethics issued a report in 1926, it borrowed liberally
from a 1920 report issued by a committee of the Conference of
Delegates of Bar Associations.2
The Delegates report, in turn,
contained excerpts from the 1909 New York statute.26 The ABA
Special
Committee
noted
that,
while
information
and
recommendations were sought from each bar association, "[tihe
21. See In re Co-Operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910).
22. Green, supra note 5, at 1126 (quoting Petitioner's Appeal from Order at 23, In
re Co-Operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910) (affidavit of Charles J.
McDermott)) (internal quotes omitted).
23. Id. at 1129 (quoting Samuel Marsh, In re Rendition of Legal Services and
Practicesof the Law by Business Corporations(1909), in Brief on Behalf of Attorney
General, In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910)) (internal quotes
omitted).
24. In re Co-Operative Law, 92 N.E. at 16 (upholding N.Y. Penal Law § 280
(1909)).
25. Andrews, supra note 12, at 585.
26. Id.
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results... were disappointing, as little information was received from
these sources, outside of New York City. 2 7 The New York statute,
passed at the urging of the protectionist New York bar, was, in this
way, "influential in the drafting of the business canons. "28
B. The 1969 Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
In 1969, the ethical canons were replaced by the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"). 29 The Model Code
reinforced and strengthened the canons' prohibitions on non-lawyer
ownership of legal service providers. The precatory language of the
1928 canons was replaced with mandatory language." Disciplinary
Rule ("DR") 3-103(A) prohibited lawyers from forming partnerships
with non-lawyers;3 1 DR 3-102(A) prohibited fee-splitting between
lawyers and non-lawyers;3 2 DR 5-107(C) prohibited lawyers from
practicing in a corporation controlled by non-lawyers;3 3 and DR 5107(B) prohibited lawyers from allowing non-lawyer third
parties to
34
direct their professional judgment in representing clients.
While these provisions were adopted with little or no debate, the
Model Code, unlike the 1928 canon, did provide some theoretical
justification for the prohibitions. 35 Because non-lawyers were not
governed "by the same rules that govern the conduct of a lawyer," the
prohibitions were deemed necessary to "protect the public. '36 The
fee-splitting prohibition was justified as necessary to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law by laymen. 7
With respect to
27. Id. at 586 n.59 (quoting 52 Rep. of the A.B.A. 374 (1927)) (internal quotes
omitted).
28. Id. at 586.
29. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility (1969).
30. ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates (June 8, 1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html
[hereinafter
1999 Final Report].
31. "A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law." Model Code of Prof'l
Responsibility DR 3-103(A) (emphasis added).
32. "A lawyer shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer...." DR 3-102(A)
(emphasis added).
33. DR 5-107(C) stated:
A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if: (1) A non-lawyer
owns any interest therein... (2) A non-lawyer is a corporate director or
officer thereof; or (3) A non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the
professional judgment of a lawyer.
DR 5-107(C) (emphasis added).
34. "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him
to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in
rendering such legal services." DR 5-107(B) (emphasis added).
35. See Andrews, supra note 12, at 589.
36. Model Code of Prof 1 Responsibility EC 3-3.
37. EC 3-8 ("Since a lawyer should not aid or encourage a layman to practice law,
he should not practice law in association with a layman or otherwise share legal fees
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employment of lawyers by non-lawyers, the Code drafters articulated
the same rationale that had led the New York Court of Appeals to
uphold the 1909 New York statute prohibiting corporations from
providing legal services-protection of the lawyer's independent
professional judgment on behalf of the client:
A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent
others possesses a potential power to exert strong pressures against

the independent judgment of those lawyers. Some employers may
be interested in furthering their own economic, political, or social
goals without regard to the professional responsibility of the lawyer
to his individual client.... [An employer may seek, consciously or
unconsciously, to further its own economic interests through the
actions of the lawyers employed by it. Since a lawyer must always
be free to exercise his professional judgment without regard to the
interests or motives of a third person, the lawyer who is employed
by one to represent another
must constantly guard against erosion of
38
his professional freedom.

C. The 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Responding to widespread general criticism of the Model Code, the
ABA in 1977 appointed a Special Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards, which came to be known as "the Kutak
Commission" after its original chairman, Robert Kutak. The Kutak
Commission was charged with the task of evaluating and revising the
Model Code. Its recommendations resulted in the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"),39 which were adopted by
the ABA in 1983.
The Kutak Commission, in its Revised Final Draft of the Model
Rules presented to the ABA House of Delegates, recommended
abandoning the Code's prohibitions on non-lawyer ownership of legal
practices. Its proposed Model Rule 5.4 would have permitted nonlawyer participation in law firm ownership provided certain ethical
obligations were met.'
In its Report on the Final Draft, the
with a layman.").
3& EC 5-23.
39. See Annotated Model Rules of Prof'i Conduct (1999).
40. Proposed Final Rule 5.4 provided in full:
Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is
held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or by a lawyer
acting in a capacity other than that of representing clients, such as a business
corporation, insurance company, legal services organization or government
agency, but only if:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required
by Rule 1.6;
(c) the organization does not engage in advertising or personal contact with
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Commission wrote that there was a "demonstrable need for expansion
of the means of making legal services more available" and that, in
order to protect client interests the rules should focus not on
"organizational forms," but on "the actual potential for abuse."'"
The ABA House of Delegates rejected Proposed Rule 5.4 after a
floor debate in June of 1982. In its place, the delegates adopted a
proposal by the General Practice Section to continue verbatim the
Code's prohibitions on non-lawyer participation in ownership of legal
practices. 42 In a now-famous exchange on the floor, Professor
Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter for and principal drafter of the Model
Rules, was asked if Proposed Rule 5.4 would permit Sears, Roebuck
to open a law office. When he responded in the affirmative, "the
debate came quickly 43to a close and the General Practice Section's
version was adopted.
While many other provisions in the Kutak Commission's Final
Draft were modified by the House of Delegates, only Proposed Rule
5.4 was rejected in its entirety." The comments accompanying ABA
Model Rule 5.4 include a one-sentence policy justification for keeping
in place the prohibitions on non-lawyer participation in ownership of
legal service providers: those prohibitions
"protect the lawyer's
'45
professional independence of judgment.

prospective clients if a lawyer employed by the organization would be
prohibited from doing so by Rule 7.2 or Rule 7.3; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates Rule 1.5.
ABA Ctr. for Prof'I Responsibility, The Legislative History of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Their Development in the ABA House of Delegates 159
(1987) [hereinafter Legislative History]. Proposed Final Rule 5.4 was the last of three
major drafts of Model Rule 5.4. For a discussion of the drafting process, and the
opposition to Proposed Rule 5.4, see Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer
Partner: Moderate Proposals Deserve a Chance, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 383, 384-92
(1988).
41. Robert J. Kutak, The New Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: A Report to
the Bar, 68 A.B.A. J. 1019, 1023 (1982).
42. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 40, at 391.
43. Id. at 392. Rule 5.4, as adopted, provides in relevant part:
Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer....
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays
the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the
lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit ....
Legislative History, supra note 40, at 163.
44. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 40, at 383 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard & W.
William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct 469 (1985)).
45. Legislative History, supra note 40, at 164.
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D. The ABA Commission on MultidisciplinaryPractice
In August 1998, ABA president Philip Anderson appointed the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice ("MDP Commission") to
consider again-in the context of recent developments in the delivery
of legal services-the propriety of prohibitions on non-lawyer
ownership of legal service providersY' The focus of the MDP
Commission, as evidenced by its title, was on partnerships between
lawyers and other professionals to provide multiple professional
services. To discharge their task properly, the Commission was asked
to "set aside the financial interests of the profession and ensure that
the public interest is served."'4 7
The Commission adopted "an extremely open and deliberative
process," establishing a website where it posted its own memoranda,
requests for comments, submissions from third parties, and
submissions and presentations made at the various town-hall-type
meetings the Commission held over the next year and a half!-'
Between August 1998 and June 1999, the Commission heard sixty
hours of testimony from fifty-six witnesses, as well as written and oral
communications from numerous others. 9 The Commission heard
from a wide range of witnesses, including consumer advocates,
representatives of accounting firms, law professors, chairs of ABA
sections and standing committees, and U.S. and foreign lawyers.5'
In June 1999, the MDP Commission issued a Final Report, to be
submitted to the House of Delegates in August of that year."' Like
the Kutak Commission before it, the MDP Commission
recommended that the rules be amended to permit lawyers to partner
with non-lawyers for the purpose of providing legal services and to
share legal fees with non-lawyers, assuming certain ethical obligations
were met.52 In crucial ways, however, the MDP proposal was
significantly less radical than the Kutak Commission's proposal.
Lawyers could only work in non-lawyer controlled MDPs if those
MDPs submitted to an annual certification process."
More
importantly, unlike the Kutak Commission's proposal, the MDP
Commission's proposal would not have allowed for passive
46. See Press Release, ABA, ABA President Philip S. Anderson Appoints
Commission
on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(Aug.
4,
1998),
at
http://www.abanet.org/media/aug98/multicom.htmi.
47. Id.
48. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J.Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 83. 129 (2000). The
Commission's website is at http://vvw.abanet.orglcprlmulticom.htmI.
49. 1999 Final Report, supra note 30.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.

786
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investment in entities providing legal services, since "[o]wnership
would be limited to members of the MDP performing professional
services."54 Therefore, under the MDP Commission's proposed rule
change, a corporation, such as Sears, could not operate a legal services
division, nor could investors buy into MDPs.
At the August 1999 ABA Meeting, the House of Delegates neither
adopted nor rejected the Commission's proposal to lift the restrictions
on MDPs. Responding to an evident lack of support for adoption of
its recommendations at that time, the MDP Commission moved to
defer a vote on the recommendations in response to requests by state
and local bar associations for more time to consider the issues."
Ominously, the House adopted a resolution proposed by the Florida
bar that no amendments to the Model Rules permitting lawyer
participation in MDPs be made "unless and until additional study
demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest without
sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal
profession's tradition of loyalty to clients."56
In response to the Florida resolution, the MDP Commission
continued its investigation of the issues. Its members met with state
and local bar authorities to explain its position and receive additional
public comment. 7 In July 2000, the MDP Commission presented a
revised report to the ABA House of Delegates. 8 The proposal in the
2000 Report was even less radical than that in the 1999 Report. The
2000 proposal made it explicit that passive investment in MDPs was
not authorized, and it would have permitted lawyers to share fees and
partner with non-lawyer professionals only if "the lawyers [had] the
control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the
rendering of legal services."5 9 Precisely what quantum of "control and
authority" was "necessary to assure lawyer independence" was left,
perhaps deliberately, vague.
This time around, the House of Delegates flatly rejected the MDP
Commission's recommendation. After barely an hour of debate, it
adopted instead a resolution based in large part on a report issued by
the New York State Bar Association' reaffirming the existing
54. Id.
55. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 146.
56. ABA, House of Delegates Debate: The House Adopted a Revised Version of
the Florida Bar Recommendation, at http://www.abanet.orgllpmlbodies/mdparticle
10797_body.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2001).
57. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 146.
58. ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates, at http:lwww.abanet.orglcpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2001).
59. Some members of the Commission would have compromised further and
"added a specific requirement in the Recommendation that there be a lawyer
majority ownership of an MDP... and that a primary purpose of the MDP be the
delivery of legal services." Id.
60. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 148; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Special

2001]

ETHICS OFMIDDLE-CLASS ACCESS

prohibitions on non-lawyer ownership of legal practice."' The drafters
of the resolution wrote that "[t]he law governing lawyers was
developed to protect the public interest," and they urged state bar
authorities to adopt the following principles:
[1]. Jurisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar
the practice of law by entities other than law firms.
[2]. The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership
and control of the practice of law by non-law\yers are inconsistent
with the core values of the legal profession.
[3]. The law governing lawyers, which prohibits lawyers from sharing
legal fees with non-lawyers and from directly or indirectly
transferring to non-lawyers ownership or control over entities
practicing law, should not be revised. 62

The MDP Commission was discharged "with the Association's
gratitude for the Commission's hard work and with commendation for
its substantial contributions to the profession."63
E. Current State Bar Activity
The ABA is a voluntary organization without legal authority, and

the rules of ethics that it promulgates have no coercive force unless
and until adopted by the states. The organization's influence on state
bar associations has historically been considerable. After the ABA
promulgated the ABA Canons (1908). and the ABA Model Code
(1969), most states simply adopted the ABA's rules without change.'
Today, however, "the ABA is not as influential as it once was," and
many states "have modified the Model Rules to reflect state practices
and prior law."'65 Nonetheless, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have some form of the MDP prohibition, whether based on
Model Rule 5.4 or its predecessors, and none allow non-lawyer
ownership of legal service providers.'
Comm. on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation, Preserving the Core
Values of the American Legal Profession: The Place of Multidisciplinary Practice in
the Law Governing Lawyers 1-2 (2000). The fact that New York played a key role in
scuttling the Committee's recommendation is no small irony, given the state's role in
developing the prohibitions in the first place. See supra text accompanying notes 2024,28.
61. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 147.
62. ABA, Recommendation, at httpJ/www.abanet.orglcpr/mdprecoml0f.html
(last visited Oct. 18,2001).
63. Id.
64. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 55-58 (1986).
65. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48. at 149.
66. Two jurisdictions briefly flirted with rule changes that, like the Kutak
Commission's proposal, would have allowed for corporate ownership and passive
investment in legal service firms. North Dakota, in January 1986. approved a
proposed version of Model Rule 5.4 modeled on the Kutak Commission proposal, but
the state Supreme Court, without comment, refused to adopt the change and restored
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The MDP debate did not, however, end on the floor of the ABA
House of Delegates. The vast majority of state bar associations have
undertaken to conduct their own studies and make their own
recommendations. As of August 1, 2001, forty-four states had
commissioned a study of the MDP prohibition; of those, fourteen had
recommended relaxing the prohibition, either in whole or in part, and
fifteen had recommended keeping the prohibitions in place.67
II. THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE MIDDLE CLASS
A. The Problem of Defining the Middle Class

Any analysis of the effectiveness of the legal services industry in
meeting the needs of middle-class consumers must confront an initial
definitional problem: who are, or what is, the "middle class?" In the
United States, the middle class is a notoriously amorphous
socioeconomic category, and social scientists cannot agree on a single
definition.' Some studies stress income, others education, still others
occupation, as the central factor in defining middle-class status. 69 The
elasticity of the category is demonstrated by the fact that most
Americans define themselves as middle class.7" When Americans are
asked to choose among lower, middle and upper class in most pollseven in surveys taken during the Depression-more than eight in ten
Americans describe themselves as middle class. 71 This includes two in
ten of the people who make less than $15,000, and more than nine in
ten of those who make over $75,000. It can truly be said of middleclass America that "even though
no one can define it, everyone
72
believes that they belong to it."

Even assuming that income is the correct yardstick to use, there is
little agreement on what range of income is middle class. Some argue
the restrictive language. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 40, at 400. The District of
Columbia Bar Association Committee also proposed a rule that would have allowed
for corporate ownership. See id. at 394. The Board of Governors modified the
proposal, however, and District of Columbia Rule 5.4, as adopted, allows law firms to
make non-lawyers partners and permits fee-sharing and partnerships between nonlawyers, only where the sole purpose of the partnership is to provide legal services.
See District of Columbia Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.4 (2000), reprintedin Nat'l Rep.
on Legal Ethics (2001).
67. See Multidisciplinary Practice Comm'n, Status of Multidisciplinary Practice
Studies by State (and Some Local Bars) (August 31, 2001), at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdp-stateaction.html.
68. Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 939,967-68 (1997).
69. Id. at 968.
70. Sam Roberts, Fitting In: Another Kind of Middle-Class Squeeze, N.Y. Times,
May 18, 1997, § 4, at 1.
71. See id.
72. N.Y. City Council, Hollow In The Middle: The Rise and Fall of New York
City's Middle Class (1997), at http://www.council.nyc.ny.us/finance/middleclass.htm.
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that the middle class must include the middle level of income and a
percentage of households above it, while others say you have to dip
below the middle point.7 3 When defining the middle class, politicians
tend to be inclusive, at least at the upper range. In his 1993 State of
the Union Address, President Bill Clinton proclaimed the wealthy to

be those with an income in excess of $100,000.1 4 New York Governor
George Pataki put the middle-class ceiling at $175,000, while
Congressman Fred Heineman, whose total income is $183,500,
'
proclaimed himself to be "lower middle class."75
These definitions
lend support to Barbara Ehrenreich's ironic claim that in America "in
order to be middle class.., one also has to be rich."76

For purposes of this Article, we also intend to be inclusive. We
consider the middle class to include those individuals and households
who are ineligible for publicly supported legal services, but have not
yet accumulated capital sufficient to sustain a comfortable lifestyle
without maintaining their current income. We assume that most
Americans are within that group. 8

B. Empirical Evidence of the Gap Between Middle-Class Demand and
Available Service
Reform-minded scholars have long assumed that there is an unmet
demand for legal services among middle-class Americans. TM
73. Don Hayner, Life In The Middle, Chi. Sun-Times, Jan. 26, 1992, 1992 WL
3448490.
74. Jonathan Peterson, Who Is Considered Rich? it's the $100,000 Question, LA.
Times, Feb. 17,1993, at Al.
75. See Roberts, supra note 70.
76. Id.
77. The Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), a private nonprofit corporation
established by Congress in 1974 to provide civil legal assistance, is required to
establish maximum income levels for those eligible for free legal assistance. See 42
U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(A) (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(a) (2000). Section 1611.3(b) of the
Corporation's Regulations establishes a maximum income level equivalent to 125%
of the Federal Poverty Guidelines, which in turn are established by the Department
of Health and Human Services. In 2001. to be eligible for LSC assistance, a family of
four must have an income no higher than $22,063. See Legal Services Corporation,
Federal Register Notices: 16 C.F.R. Part 1611 Eligibility: Income Level for
Individuals Eligible for Assistance, at http://www.lsc.gov/FOIA/fmIfrl61101.htm (last
visited Oct. 14,2001).
78. In 1999, 80% of American households made less than $79,375, and the ninetyfifth percentile began at $142,021. U.S. Census Bureau, Money Income in the United
States, Current Population Reports. Consumer Income 1999, at xii, http./lwwvw.
census.gov/prod/2000pubsp6O-209.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,2001).
79. See, e.g., Talbot D'Alemberte, Calling the Role of Lawyers: ProvidingService
to All, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 861, 863 (1992) ("What lawyers have failed to do is to
provide access to legal services for the poor and middle class."); Stephen Ellmann,
Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 Colum. L Rev. 116, 117 (1990)
("The unavailability of lawyers to many who need them is a chronic problem .... ");
Lawrence J. Fox, A Nation Under Lost Lawyers: The Legal Professionat the Close of
the Twentieth Century, Money Didn't Buy Happiness, 100 Dick. L Rev. 531, 541
(1996) ("[A]mong the middle class, it is almost impossible to find lawyers to perform
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Comments such as Derek Bok's that "[t]here is far too much law for
those who can afford it and far too little for those who cannot,"'8 , or

President Carter's famous lament that "[90] per cent of our lawyers

serve 10 per cent of our people,""s have become truisms. Until
recently, there has been little hard empirical data to support these
contentions. 2 In the past thirty years, however, data collection efforts
on the part of the organized bar have attempted to measure and
define the unmet demand for legal services among ordinary
Americans.
These so-called "legal need" studies are by no means above
criticism and are at best imprecise. 3 The concept of legal need
encompasses a variety of perceptions and beliefs as to the
circumstances in which a lawyer's services are necessary or
appropriate.' 4 Tests applied in assessing whether need, regardless of
definition, is being met also vary.85 With those limitations in mind, the
legal needs studies provide valuable data for testing the hypothesis
that there is in fact an unmet demand for legal services. Some of the
numbers emerging from those studies are quite startling.

any services at affordable rates...."); Quintin Johnstone, Lawyer Obligations to
Moderate-Income Persons, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 845, 845 (1992) ("Lawyers are
underserving or overcharging many persons of moderate income who are in need of
legal services."); Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing21st Century Lawyers,
69 Wash. L. Rev. 625, 631 (1994) ("Middle-class clients have long been unable to
afford legal services.").
80. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. Legal
Educ. 570, 571 (1983).
81. Jimmy Carter, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary Luncheon of the Los Angeles
County Bar Association (May 4, 1978), in 64 A.B.A. J. 840, 842 (1978) (criticizing the
legal profession for excessive litigation and self-interest, and inadequate service to the
poor and middle class).
82. See, e.g., Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62
Ind. L.J. 151, 156 (1987) (lamenting lack of scholarship and calling for empirical
studies on the legal profession's impact on consumers).
83. For a critique of the "legal needs" studies described in this section, see
Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of ProfessionalReform, 45 Md. L. Rev. 274, 281
(1986). Rhode argues that:
The "legal need" studies are problematic on several levels. From an
empirical perspective, it is unclear precisely what is being measured. Any
society generates a vast array of conflicts that could give rise to legal action.
Whether they do is a function of the organization of the legal system and its
broader cultural setting.
Id.
84. See Marc Galanter, Delivering Legality: Some Proposalsfor the Direction of
Research, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev. 225, 226 (1976) [hereinafter Galanter, Delivering
Legality] (describing legal needs as a social construct, and not some "Archimedean
starting point against which we can measure the adequacy of legal services"). For a
critical view of the rhetoric and perceived wisdom surrounding the "litigation
explosion," see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983).
85. See Galanter, DeliveringLegality, supra note 84.
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The first major legal needs study, commissioned by the American
Bar Foundation ("ABF"), was conducted in 1974 and updated in
1989.86 The study revealed that over two-thirds of the adult
population will consult a lawyer at least once in their lifetime.' Fortynine percent of adults in the top quintile of the income scale had
consulted a lawyer in the three years prior to 1989, but only 27% of
adults in the lowest 10% had used legal services during the same
period.' Reasons offered by respondents for not seeking out a lawyer
included (1) lack of information about the legal character of a
problem; (2) not knowing how to find a lawyer; (3) not believing one
can afford a lawyer's help; and (4) fear of lawyers and legal
proceedings.' Cost was the second most frequently cited reason for
not seeking out a lawyer, and the authors concluded that "[c]ost
remains a significant element in the decision to seek legal
assistance." 90
More recently, in 1994 the ABA issued the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study, 91 which was based on more than 3,000 interviews
conducted with low- and moderate-income Americans during 1993 to
determine their legal needs and their response to those needsY For
purposes of the study, "moderate-income households" were defined
to include households with a combined annual income above 125% of
the poverty threshold but below $60,000.1 While the study's low
point fits nicely with our middle-class floor-the point at which
consumers are no longer eligible for state-funded legal services-its
ceiling of $60,000 leaves out many households we would consider
middle class. 4 As a result, the study is only a partial picture of
"middle-class" as we define it-more specifically, it is the lower half of
the picture. With this caveat in mind, the results are nonetheless
striking.

86. See Barbara A. Curran & Francis 0. Spalding. The Legal Needs of the Public
1 (1974); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 541-42 (1994) (citing Barbara A. Curran, Report on the
1989 Survey of the Public's Use of Legal Services, in Two Nationwide Surveys: 1989
Pilot Assessment of the Poor & Public Generally 55 (1989)).
87. See Cramton, supra note 86, at 541 n.23.

88. Id. at 542.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 542 n.28 (alteration in original).
91. Inst. for Survey Research, Temple U., Findings of the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study (1994) [hereinafter Comprehensive Legal Needs Study].
92. Inst. for Survey Research, Temple U., Legal Needs Among Low-Income and
Moderate-Income Households: Summary of Findings from the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study 4-6 (1994), reprinted in Comprehensive Legal Needs Study, supra note
91 [hereinafter Legal Needs Study Summary].
93. Id. at 3.
94. The study designers chose to place the high point of "moderate" income at the
top one-fifth of the population. See id.
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The report found that 52% of all moderate-income households
reported a legal need in 1992. 95 The term "legal need" as used in the
study meant "specific situations members of households were dealing
with that raised legal issues-whether or not they were recognized as
'legal' or taken to some part of the civil justice system. 9 6 The most
commonly reported needs among moderate-income households were
(1) personal finance and consumer needs (17%); (2) housing and
property (12%); (3) employment-related legal needs (12%); (4)
community and regional controversies (12%);
(5) estates (10%); and
97
(10%).
injuries
economic
and
(6) personal
When asked what steps they took to deal with their legal need, only
39% of respondents in the moderate-income category turned to a
lawyer for help.9 This means that almost two-thirds of moderateincome Americans with legal needs in 1992 received no professional
assistance. The most common reasons offered for not seeking
professional assistance were the respondents' conclusions that it was
not really a problem, they could handle it on their own, or a lawyer's
involvement would not help matters.99 Perhaps surprisingly, only 8%
of respondents cited cost as a factor in not seeking a lawyer. 00 Fiftyfour percent of those who did turn to a lawyer for help declared
themselves satisfied with the results, compared to a 39% satisfaction
rate among those who took no action at all.' 01
Several state bar studies have been conducted since the ABA's 1994
Comprehensive Legal Needs Study. The most extensive and recent is
the Oregon State Bar's report, "The State of Access to Justice in
Oregon," which detailed the legal needs of 1,011 low- and moderateincome persons throughout Oregon in 1999 and 2000."° Unlike the
1994 ABA study, the Oregon study did not separate out the results for
low-income (those who qualify for free legal assistance) and
95. Id. at 8.
96. ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil
Justice: A Survey of Americans, Major Findings from the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study 2, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ladown/legneedstudy.pdf (last
visited Nov. 8,2001).
97. Legal Needs Study Summary, supra note 92, at 10.

98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. But see Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay
Conveyancers- Empirical Evidence Says "Cease Fire!", 31 Conn. L. Rev. 423, 438
(1999). Palomar found the following:

[A] major reason for not having a lawyer in a home purchase transaction is
the parties' desire to avoid the expense.

Of 132 homebuyers surveyed in

1990 in Columbus, Ohio, most stated that expense was their reason for not
hiring a lawyer. Twenty-three percent of 107 homebuyers questioned in a
1993 New Jersey survey responded similarly.
Id. (citations omitted).
101. Legal Needs Study Summary, supra note 92, at 32.
102. D. Michael Dale, The State of Access to Justice in Oregon (2000),
http://www.orbar.org/Research/home.html.
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moderate-income persons. 103 Nonetheless, the results are pertinent to
our inquiry since, as the ABA study itself showed, there is little
divergence between the legal needs of low- and moderate-income
persons. 1°'
The greatest legal needs experienced by respondents in the Oregon
study were in the area of housing (32%), public services (31%), family
(27%), employment (27%), and consumer problems (25%).' Most
of these legal needs went unmet. Survey respondents reported that
they obtained legal representation for fewer than 20% of their legal
problems."° When asked to explain why no legal assistance was
sought in these cases, respondents replied as follows:
"Nothing can be done: 17%
"Not a legal problem: 12%
"Nowhere to get help: 12%
"Too much hassle: 12%
"Worried about cost: 11%
" Afraid or intimidated: 11%
* Turned to other help: 7%

* Help not needed: 7%
"Advised not worthwhile: 1%
"Did not want public dispute: 1%
" Other: 10%.107

As with the ABA study, there was a high degree of satisfaction with
the outcome among those who did seek a lawyer's help (76%
satisfaction rate), compared with those who did not seek a lawyer's
help (24% satisfaction rate)."m The authors of the study came to the
conclusion that the "current legal services delivery system cannot
103. The Oregon study "examine[d] the civil legal needs of low (up to 125% of
poverty) and moderate-income (between 125% and 200% of poverty) households."
Id. at3.
104. Id. at 5. For example, the ABA's 1994 study reported 47% of low-income
households had a legal need, statistically indistinguishable from the reported 52% of
legal needs for moderate-income households. See Legal Needs Study Summary, supra
note 92, at 8. Moderate-income households did turn to a lawyer for help in greater
numbers a reported 39% of the time, however, compared to 29% for low-income
households. See id. at 20.
105. Dale, supra note 102, at 19.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 32.
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meet the critical legal needs" for legal services among lower- and
moderate-income Oregonians.c 9
The results of the Oregon study are echoed in other state studies.
A 1996 study commissioned by the California Bar Association
concluded that "the legal needs of approximately three-quarters of all
poor people are not being met at all;" ' and, while the picture was not
so gloomy for "middle-income" Californians, "they are still unable to
afford representation in many instances," resulting in "harm and
injustice to these families of moderate means.""' A Florida Bar
Association study found similarly that 70% of legal needs faced by
low- and moderate-income Floridians went unmet.1 2 The Colorado
Bar Association reported that 75% of the legal needs of low-income
persons were going unmet, and that "[p]ersons with moderateincomes share the frustration of being unable to obtain critical
professional advice and representation in the legal system.""' 3
In the summer of 1995, the Commission on Providing Access to
Legal Services for Middle Income Consumers of the New York State
Bar conducted a telephone survey of six hundred New Yorkers with
annual incomes between $25,000 and $95,000."14 At first blush, the
results of the New York study paint a somewhat rosier picture of the
legal profession's ability to meet the needs of middle-class consumers.
More than one-fourth of those consumers polled had used an attorney
in the prior six months, and another one-fourth had used an attorney
some time in the previous six months." 5 More than one-half of those
who had used an attorney had done so for a will, for an inheritance or
probate matter, or to buy or sell real estate.' 6 Only 9% responded
"Yes" to the question "Have you ever been unable to get an attorney
for an important problem when you thought you needed one?""' 7 The
Commission found this "unmet need ... of a relatively modest
proportion [to be] a surprising and satisfying result of the survey."",,

109. Id. at 38.
110. Access to Justice Working Group, Cal. Bar Ass'n, And Justice For All:
Fulfilling the Promise of Access to Civil Justice in California: Executive Summary
(1996), at http://www.calbar.org2bar/3acc/4accO7.htm.
111. Id.
112. Mark D. Killian, Study: Legal Needs Going Unmet, Fla. B. News, Mar. 15,
1995, available at http://www.afn.org/-afn54735/legalneedsl.html (discussing findings
of the Florida Comprehensive Legal Needs Study).
113. Colo. Bar Ass'n, Report of the Legal Services/Pro Bono Committee of the
Judicial Advisory Council (1998), http://www.cobar.orglmandpb/unmet.htm.
114. N.Y. Bar Ass'n, The Report of the New York State Bar Association
Commission on Providing Access to Legal Services for Middle Income Consumers
(1996), http://www.nysba.org/downloadables/report.pdf.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id. app. The most common reason given (24%) for the inability to get a
lawyer was that one "could not afford the legal services." Id.
118. Id. (indicating statement in "The Survey" section).
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The New York results may seem to be at odds with the ABA and
Oregon studies, which found that a low percentage of moderateincome people with a legal need turn to a law yer for help; but the
three studies are probably reconcilable. Some of those counted by the
ABA and the Oregon study as needing legal assistance did not
recognize that they had a legal need and would also not, therefore, be
among those who would identify themselves as unable to get an
attorney. On the other hand, respondents likely answered "Yes" to
the New York question "have you ever been unable to get an
attorney?" only if they had actually tried unsuccessfully to get a

lawyer. Others may have never looked despite a perceived legal need
for a variety of reasons (as was true in the ABA and Oregon studies),

including that they were convinced before looking that they could not
afford a lawyer. Indeed, one-fourth of those surveyed in the New
York study reported that they could not afford the services of an
attorney, and another 20% said that it would depend on the

circumstances.'

9

In addition, the Commission found a substantial gap

between what New Yorkers
thought they could afford and what
2
lawyers actually charge.1 1
While difficult to compare because of their different methods and
focus, the bar association legal needs studies confirm as a whole what

has long been assumed. A significant number of Americans with legal
needs are not getting professional assistance.
C. Middle-Class Consumers Versus Corporations: How the Marketfor
Legal Services Is Dominated by Commercial Interests
What accounts for this gap between legal need and accessible legal
service for ordinary Americans? The first, and most obvious, reason
is the cost of hiring a lawyer. Second, and related, ordinary
Americans are unable to compete with business interests and highwealth individuals who command an ever greater share of the legal
services market and drive further upward the cost of legal services.
The high cost of legal services is hardly a secret. Average hourly
rates for lawyers in the United States in 1998 were $180; large-firm
partners averaged $250 an hour, with the top ten percent charging in
excess of $385 per hour.12' At these rates, even a simple legal matter
can cost tens of thousands of dollars.2' Newspapers are full of
anecdotal evidence of the high cost of legal services. The prosecution
of a discrimination lawsuit against a day-care center that netted the
plaintiff $158,500 cost $224,000 in legal feesY A chemist's claim of
119. id
120. Id.

121. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 957 (2000).
122. See id.
123. See Bob Doucette, Day Care Loses Appeal in Discrimination Suit, Saturday
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employment discrimination that netted him $230,453 cost $1.3 million
in legal fees and expenses.12 4 The legal fees for a copyright dispute
over a subscription worth $590 came to $1 million.'2 Bill Clinton's
legal bills in connection with the Paula Jones and Monica Lewinsky
scandals were approximately $10 million, 126 while the Starr
investigation cost taxpayers over $50 million.2 7 Total revenues
earned by law firms in the United States exceeded $75 billion annually
in 1987.1" The reality is that lawyers are now so extraordinarily
expensive that low- and middle-income Americans, when faced with a
legal need, often must forego the assistance of a lawyer.
Lawyers are not only costly in absolute terms. Ordinary consumers
face an additional obstacle to securing a lawyer's services: a bidding
process against the businesses and high-wealth individuals that
command more and more attention from the legal services industrya bidding process they cannot possibly hope to win. In a landmark
1975 study of the Chicago bar, the authors found a high degree of
differentiation in the legal profession between those who serve
business clients and those who serve personal clients.12 9 While the bar
is formally unified, the authors described a division of two separate

hemispheres of lawyering, with large law firms populated by elite law
school graduates serving business interests occupying one and small or
solo practitioners serving personal and small-business interests
occupying the other.13 In 1975, 53% of legal effort in Chicago was
devoted to the corporate sphere and 40% to the personal sphere. 31

Oklahoman, June 2, 2001, LEXIS, The Daily Oklahoman.
124. Court Upholds Discrimination Ruling Against University, Black Issues in
Higher Education, June 21, 2001, at 17.
125. See David Margolick, When a Firm Tries to Cut Corners; It is Caught in
Copyright Embarrassment,N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1991, at B7.
126. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Financial Holdings Stay Steady for Clinton, But
Legal Fees Soar, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1999, at A18.
127. See Editorial, An UnmournedDeath, L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1999, at B8.
128. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many
Lawyers? Perspectiveson a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 431,439 (1989).
129. John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure
of the Bar 380 (1982).
130. Id. The idea that the legal profession is a stratified one, in spite of its formal
unity, is not a new one. As early as 1921, a study on legal education commissioned by
the ABA recommended that law be formally divided into two "based on divisions
already present in the profession." Jerry Van Hoy, Franchise Law Firms and the
Transformation of Personal Legal Services 5 (1997) (citing A. Z. Reed, Training for
the Public Profession of the Law (1921), which proposed that "[o]ne bar, comprised of
lawyers trained at expensive, full-time law schools, would serve the needs of business;
a separate bar of lawyers, trained at night law schools, would include probate,
criminal, and trial practices"); see also Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers
and Social Change in Modern America (1976) (arguing profession is characterized by
cleavage between elite, white Protestant lawyers and status-seeking, working-class
ethnic and racial minorities); Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of
Individual Practitioners in Chicago 17 (1962) (discussing split between high-status
attorneys at corporate law firms and marginalized solo practitioners).
131. Heinz & Laumann, supra note 129, at 40.
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When the authors updated their study in 1995, the authors found that
the share of legal effort going to corporate clients had increased to
64%, while the total amount of legal effort on behalf of individuals
had fallen to 29%.32

U.S. Census Bureau data suggests that the trend revealed by these
Chicago studies is likely repeated across the country. The percentage
of lawyers' income received from individual clients declined nationally
from 52.2% of lawyer receipts in 1972 to 39.6% in 1992.11- In the same
time period, receipts from business interests increased from 42% to
50.9% nationally."M In Los Angeles, receipts from individuals fell
from 46.2% in 1982 to just 31% in 1992, while receipts from
businesses climbed from 49.5% to 56.6% in the same time period. 5
This pattern is not confined to "large market" cities like Chicago and
Los Angeles. In Sacramento, for example, receipts from individuals
decreased from 50.4% to 46.3% of total lawyer receipts between 1982
and 1992, while receipts from businesses increased from 38.8% to
45.2% in the same period.Structural changes in the legal services industry reflect this flow of
legal services toward business interests and away from individuals.
Large law firms serving businesses and high-wealth individuals are big
and getting bigger.'37 In the 1950s, thirty-eight law firms in the United
States had more than fifty lawyers, and more than half of these were
in New York City.' In 1985, over five hundred firms had fifty or
more lawyers.1 39 Firms with over a hundred lawyers grew from less

than a dozen in 1960 to 251 in 1986.1' In 1968, the largest law firm in
the United States had 169 lawyers." In 2001, only one of the law
firms appearing on American Lawyer's top 100 list had less than two
hundred lawyers, with Skadden, Arps boasting 1,441 lawyers
overall. 142 In contrast, the percentage of solo practitioners among
lawyers in private practice declined from 64% in 1960 to 47% in
1999.141 Particularly telling is the rate-of-growth of expenditures on
132. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Characterof Lan-ers" Work: Chicago in
1975 and 1995, 32 L. & Soc'y Rev. 751,767 (1998).
133. See U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976, 1996a. quoted in Heinz et al., supra note
132, at 767 n.23.
134. See id
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger The
Promotion-to-PartnerTournament and the Growth of Large Law Firns, 76 Va. L
Rev. 747 (1990).
138. See id. at 749.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142- America's Highest Grossing Law Firmsin 2000. Am. Law., July 2001, available
at Westlaw, 7/2001 Am. Law. 1.
143. See Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal
Profession in 1995, at 7 tbls. 4 & 5 (1999).
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legal services, which was 555% for business interests from 1967 to
1992, more than twice the rate-of-growth for individual client
expenditures during that same period.'"
D. The Prohibitionon Non-Lawyer Ownership of Legal Service
Providersand the Middle Class
1. The Role Played by the Prohibition in Keeping the Cost of Legal
Services Unaffordably High
Even recognizing that the market for legal services has become
increasingly dominated by commercial interests, one might
legitimately ask, "So what?" Is this anything more than the response
of a properly functioning market to changes in the U.S. economy?
After all, the U.S. economy has undergone surges of explosive
economic growth in recent decades, and major changes in the
institutional mechanisms that regulate corporate actors have further
contributed to the demand for legal services in the commercial
sector.'4 5
Those changes include increasing and broad-based
government regulation of business in the 1970s; the expansion of
corporate tort liability for injuries to workers, consumers, and other
third parties; the rise in the financial conception of the corporation
leading to unprecedented numbers of corporate transactions in the
1980s and '90s; and the deregulation of corporate finance and
corporate transactions. 146 Should not the parallel growth of law firms
to serve those economic interests be expected-in fact, welcomed? Is
not the ever-increasing dominance of the business sector of the legal
services industry simply a function of the competitive market for legal
services, with services flowing to the market players who value them
the most?
This assumes, however, a competitive market for legal services. In
fact, the market for legal services is noncompetitive and strictly
regulated on the supply-side by the service providers themselves. The
144. See Marc Galanter, "Old and in the Way"." The Coming Demographic
Transformationof the Legal Profession and Its Implicationsfor the Provision of Legal
Services, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 1081, 1088.
145. See Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of the
Large Law Firm 349-55 (1988).
146. See id.; see also Robert MacCrate, "The Lost Lawyer" Regained: The Abiding
Values of the Legal Profession, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 587 (1996). MacCrate noted that:
New areas of law and regulation, largely designed by lawyers, created whole
new fields for legal services, such as the environment, occupational health

and safety, nuclear energy, discrimination and individual rights, health and
mental health care, biotechnology, and the development and use of
computers. At the same time, economic activity vastly expanded, new
business enterprises multiplied, and the number of transactions in every
segment of the economy proliferated.
MacCrate, supra,at 600-01.
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regulation of the supply of legal services takes several forms. 4 ' One is
the direct regulation of access to the profession by way of admission
requirements to law school, the bar examination, and the bar
admission process." Another is the prohibition on the practice of law
by non-lawyers, which ensures that the business of providing legal
services is a monopoly enjoyed exclusively by lawyers."' Another
significant form of regulation is enforced through the profession's
"ethical" rules.
Specifically, ABA Model Rule 5.4. and its
predecessors and state equivalents, prohibit any non-lawyer
participation in the ownership of legal service providers, including
passive investment. 5
The result of these interlocking and complimentary regulations is a
strictly regulated and noncompetitive market. "In a competitive
market, greater production efficiencies translate into lower prices as
competitors bid prices down towards the new, lower costs."''1 When
the supply of legal services is deliberately kept low, legal resources are
inevitably "pulled disproportionately into the commercial sphere, and
individuals are largely priced out of the market.' 5 12 As Gillian
Hadfield has argued convincingly:
Lawyers in fact face a string of powerful market incentives to charge
fees above those that would emerge in a competitive market. As is
typical of noncompetitive markets, the legal market results in prices
being determined by the value placed on them by consumers, not
the cost of providing the service. The allocation of lawyers' efforts
are thereby skewed to those who place high monetary value on legal
services 53and are able to pay these large sums: generally, commercial
clients.
Hadfield further contends:
The cost of monopoly.., is... the inertia and unresponsiveness of
an insulated service provider. The legal system qua system is largely
immune to pressures to reduce costs: those with disputes have no
coercive alternative to the costly system if they are plaintiffs and no
choice, period, if they are defendants. The autonomy of law is, in
very important respects, that of an institution that can establish its

147. See Cramton, supra note 86, at 544.
148. See id
149. See, e.g., Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An
Economic Analysis of the Justificationsfor Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 Ariz. St.
L.J. 429. 483 (2001); Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the UnauthorizedPracticeof
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581

(1999).
150. See Annotated Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.4 (1999); supra Part I.
151. Michael Trebilcock & Lilla Csorgo, Multi-Disciplinary Professional Practices:
A Consumer Welfare Perspective (Aug. 4, 1999) (on file with the Fordham Law

Review).

152. Hadfield, supra note 121, at 956.

153. Id.
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own values.., without pressure to take into account an important
4
value for participants in the system: the cost of participating."0
The legal services regulatory scheme and its various prohibitions thus
play a prominent role in ensuring that the price of participation in the
legal services market remains too high for most Americans.
Though it is only one facet of the regulatory scheme, the ethical
prohibition on non-lawyer ownership of legal service providers plays a
notable role in restricting the supply of legal services to ordinary
Americans. By denying to non-lawyers the opportunity to buy and
resell the services of lawyers, granting to lawyers the exclusive right to
earn a profit from investment in the legal services industry, and
denying to non-lawyers the opportunity to compete for management
positions in for-profit law firms, the ownership restriction serves to
"keep the law business all in the family. '1 55 It helps to keep the
market for legal services noncompetitive and the price of legal
services artificially high. By prohibiting alternative vehicles for the
delivery of legal services, the ethics rules virtually ensure that lowand middle-income consumers will go underserved, since ordinary
consumers cannot possibly hope to win a bidding war against
commercial interests 156
for the limited goods available in a
noncompetitive market.
The anticompetitive effects of Model Rule 5.4 and its predecessors
have not escaped the notice of the FTC, which has taken the position
that the corporate ownership prohibition should be abolished." 7
Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, then Director of the FTC Bureau of
Competition, in urging the Supreme Court of Kentucky not to adopt
Rule 5.4, emphasized those anticompetitive effects:
Proposed Rule 5.4 would limit the ability of lawyers to establish
multidisciplinary practices with other professionals, such as
psychologists or accountants, to deal efficiently with both the legal
and nonlegal aspects of specific problems. [It]... also would appear
to bar lawyers from including any lay persons, such as marketing
directors, as partners in their law firms. Finally, such a restriction
would appear to prohibit corporate practice, and thereby prevent
the use of potentially efficient business formats....

Proposed Rule 5.4 might limit potentially procompetitive
professional ventures, innovative business formats, and perhaps
154. Id. at 993.
155. Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A
Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 243,268 (1985).
156. See supra Part II.C.
157. See Andrews, supra note 12, at 620. Parallel ethical prohibitions in the AMA
code of ethics were struck down by a 1979 FTC decision. See infra text accompanying
notes 232-40.
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some forms of prepaid legal services. [It] ... might prevent lawyers
from achieving savings in marketing that could be passed on to
consumers. For example, the proposed rule would not permit a
retailer such as Sears to employ attorneys to provide legal services
to the public. If attorneys were permitted to enter into such an
arrangement, it would be feasible for them to advertise on a national
scale and share advertising time with other Sears service providers,
s
such as its insurance, stock brokerage, and realty subsidiaries'
The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that lawyer rules of
professional conduct are protected as "state action" when they are
adopted by a state's highest court." 9 This state action defense
protects "anticompetitive activities carried out by private parties
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy that is supervised actively
by the state generally." 1"
Because the MDP prohibition ensures zero non-lawyer investment
in the business of law, consumers of legal services are denied the
benefits of investment that would almost certainly be forthcoming,
given the size of the legal market were it not for the prohibition. Any
industry that grows at almost twice the pace of the gross national
product, as the legal services industry did between 1977 and 1988, is
likely to attract investment.' 6' Despite the unmet needs for legal
services, 162 individuals' expenditures on legal services increased 261%
from 1967 to 1982.163 Therefore, were it not for the prohibition on
non-lawyer investment, we could expect to see specific investment in
the legal service market for ordinary consumers despite the
dominance of commercial interests in the market for legal services.
As Stephen Gillers points out, "[t]he rule of thumb has been that a
law firm associate's time should be billed at a rate that nets a profit of
one-third after deduction of salary and overhead. That's a pretty
good margin, one other investors might be willing to undersell. '""b
Enhanced production economies with resulting increase in quality
of service may also result from the integration of legal services with
other professional services in MDPs. MDPs, unlike independent law
firms, have the ability to deliver an integrated team approach to
serving client interests and problems requiring services in different
158. Letter from Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, to Robert F. Stephen. C.J. of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky 5-6 (June 8, 1987), quoted in Andrews, supra note 12, at 620
(omissions in original).
159. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,361 (1977).
160. See Andrews, supra note 12, at 620.
161. Between 1977 and 1989 the Gross National Product grew by 260%, whereas
the legal services industry grew by some 480%. See Nelson. supra note 145, at 345
(citing Robert E. Litan & Steven Salop, More Value for the Legal Dollar A New
Look at Attorney-Client Fees and Relationships 2 (Aug. 1992) (unpublished paper
presented at Annual Meeting of ABA)).
162. See supra Part II.B.
163. See Sander & Williams, supra note 128. at 441.
164. Gillers. supra note 155, at 268.
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fields. 65 The ability of MDPs to provide so-called "one-stop
shopping" may lead not only to lower-cost provision of legal services
but better service for consumers generally because of the broader
expertise of the service providers and the close cooperation of a
professional, interdisciplinary team."6 The MDP prohibition is a
''virtual guarantee that the quality of expertise generally available to
clients will be lower than optimum.""167 Given the likely cost-savings
and convenience, middle-income individuals are likely to choose an
integrated provider of professional services rather than a stand-alone
professional enterprise.' 68
2. The Information Barrier, Technology, and Non-Lawyer Investment
in Legal Service Providers
In addition to affordability, the legal needs studies highlight another
important barrier to middle-class access to legal services: lack of
information.
Unlike high-wealth individuals and corporations,
middle-class consumers often simply do not recognize their legal
needs or, if recognized, do not know how to go about meeting them.
Those survey respondents who needed but did not seek legal services
often cited lack of information or not knowing how to find a lawyer as
factors in that decision. 169 Twelve percent of such respondents in the
Oregon study said there was nowhere to get help, and another 12%
said it was too much trouble.' Those respondents who did consult a
lawyer rarely used the systems currently relied on by the legal
profession for reaching this sector of society. In the ABA's legal
needs study, just 4% of moderate-income households that engaged a
lawyer did so through a lawyer referral service.7 Eleven percent
165. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 117; Stephen Gillers, The Anxiety
of Influence, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 123, 135 (1999); Katherine L. Harrison, Comment,
Multidisciplinary Practices:Changing the Global View of the Legal Profession, 21 U.
Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 879, 913-14 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, Redefining Lawyers' Work:
MultidisciplinaryPractice,A Primeron MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New
Rule?, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 869,891 (1999).
166. See Terry, supra note 165, at 891; see also Michael J. Meyers, "Elder-Comp,
L.L. C.": A Multi-disciplinaryPrototypefor Tomorrow's Elder Law Practice, 45 S.D.
L. Rev. 540 (1999-2000) (noting the "fragmented" nature of the market for
professional services and arguing that senior citizens need integrated professional
services, and pointing to MDP prohibition as a big problem); Louise G. Trebek &
Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary Practices for
People, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 227, 228-29 (2000) (arguing that low- and moderate-income
people need integrated professional practices).
167. Burnele V. Powell, Flight from the Center: Is It Just or Just About Money?, 84
Minn. L. Rev. 1439, 1467 (2000).
168. See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 151 (listing potential cost savings for
consumers using MDPs are in searching, contracting, coordinating, monitoring, and
information costs).
169. See supra text accompanying note 89.
170. Dale, supra note 102, at 34.
171. Inst. for Survey Research, Temple U., Legal Needs Among Moderate-Income
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reported finding a lawyer through the telephone directory and 6%

reported finding a lawyer through either a "legal hotline, electronic or
print media, direct solicitation, prepaid legal plan, [or] service
provider."172
Traditional information and intake systems are
apparently inadequate to meet the needs of middle-class consumers of
legal services.

One obvious way to address this information gap is to harness the
emerging Internet and computer software technologies to make legal
services information more readily accessible to middle-class
consumers. 173
These technologies are relatively inexpensive,
extremely accessible, and have interactive capability as well as
virtually unlimited capacity to convey information.
There is little question that individual and household Internet
access in the United States is climbing rapidly, particularly among
middle-income Americans. 74 Data on Internet use indicates that,
after e-mail, searching for information is the most common use of the
Internet among home users. 75 People are literally turning to the
Internet to look for answers. They use the Internet to obtain medical
diagnoses and prescription drugs, to trade stock, to secure a mortgage,
and to transact business. 76

Very often, the answers lay people are

looking for are answers to legal problems. As one commentator put
it, "[i]n cyberspace, the much-decried unmet legal needs of middleincome people are available for the world to see, with just a few clicks
of a mouse. The Internet abounds with tales of legal woe, presented
through a number of different vehicles."'" Perhaps predictably, the
Households: Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 52 (1994),
reprintedin Comprehensive Legal Needs Study, supra note 91.
172. Id. at 53.
173. See Richard Zorza, Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics
and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to Opportunity. 67
Fordham L. Rev. 2659,2659-60 (1999).
174. In August 2000, more than half of all households (51%) in the United States
had computers, a 58% increase in twenty months, and 41.5% of U.S. households had
Internet access. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital
Inclusion, A Report on Americans' Access to Technology Tools 1 (2000),
http://wwv.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahomeldigitaldivide. The share of individuals using the
Internet was at 44.4% in August 2000, an increase of 32.7% in twenty months. Id. at
33. Internet access in middle-income households rose more rapidly than in any other
income bracket. Over 46% of households with income between S35,000 and S49,999
had Internet access in August 2000, up from 29.5% in 1998. Id. at 8. Households with
incomes between $50,000 and $74,999 climbed from 43.9% to 60.9% in the same time
period, while households with incomes over $75,000 went from 60.3% to 77.7% with
Internet access. Id. Internet access in rural households is also climbing rapidly, with
38.9% having Internet access in August 2000, an increase of 75% in twenty months.
Id. at5.
175. Id. at 48.
176. Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consulner
Protectionor Protection of the Legal Cartel?. 34 Ind. L. Rev. 121. 123 (2000).
177. Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril
and the Promise,49 Duke L.J. 147, 151 (1999).
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legal self-help industry has quickly embraced emerging technologies,
with websites such as FreeAdvice.com, Lectlaw.com, Nolo.com, and
software packages like Turbotax and Willmaker enjoying increasing
popularity. 17 8
Why has the sector of the bar serving middle-class clients not
recognized and tapped into the Internet's potential for reaching those
with legal needs? In fact, though traditionally slow to embrace new
technologies, more and more law firms are now on-line with their own
websites 7 9 But once again, a distinction is apparent between the
sector of the profession serving business clients, and the small law
firms and solo practitioners typically serving small business and
middle-income consumers. Surveys conducted by the ABA's Legal
Technology Resource Center show that small firms are not embracing
the Internet as fast as large law firms. A 1999 survey found that 71%
of large law firms, but just 32% of small firms, had their own
websites. 8 0° For whatever reason-whether it be cost constraints, time
constraints, operational inefficiencies associated with serving middleincome consumers of legal services, or simply a failure to recognize
the Internet's potential for reaching a mass market for legal servicesthe sector of the bar devoted to serving middle-income clients has not
yet harnessed the Internet's potential for meeting those clients' needs.
One explanation is that many lawyers traditionally serving middleclass consumers perceive the Internet, with its proliferation of legal
self-help resources, as well as self-help computer software, as the
enemy.'' Indeed, potential clients may seek answers to their legal
questions or attempt to prepare their own legal documents with online assistance rather than suffering the inconvenience and expense of
visiting a lawyer. To the degree that such consumers can adequately
178. Matthew Benjamin, Legal Self-Help: Cheap Counsel for Simple Cases, U.S.

News & World Rep., Feb. 12, 2001, at 54; Anne Colden, Self-Help Law Customers
Courted Technology Making Services More Accessible, Denver Post, Feb. 12, 2001,
LEXIS, The Denver Post; Jennifer Lee, Dot-Corn, Esq.: Legal Guidance, Lawyer

Optional,N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at G1.
179. See William Hornsby, Improving the Delivery of Affordable Legal Services
Through the Internet: A Blueprint for the Shift to a Digital Paradigm (2000), at

http://www.lawschoolconsortium.net/hornsby@20article.htm

(on

file

with

the

FordhamLaw Review).
180. Firm Internet Access Nears 100 Percent, 61 Or. State B. Bull. 7 (2000) (citing

ABA 1999 Legal Technology Survey Report).
181. One recent illustration of the profession's resistance to self-help computer
technology occurred in Texas, when that state's Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee managed to convince a federal judge that the sale of Quicken Family
Lawyer constituted the unauthorized practice of law. See Unauthorized Practice of
Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. Civ.A.3:97:CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 22, 1999). That decision, if upheld, would have resulted in a blanket ban on
the distribution of legal self-help software within Texas. The Texas legislature acted
quickly to overrule Parsons, however, amending its unauthorized practice statute to
expressly exclude the distribution of self-help software from the definition of the
practice of law. See Tex. Gov. Code Ann. § 81.101(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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meet their needs in this way, the Internet may already be helping to
address the problem of providing more affordable legal services to the
middle class. On the other hand, those consumers whose needs
require the individual attention of a trained lawyer may be ill-served
by a self-help legal website or legal assistance software.'
Ideally, Internet and computer software technology would be
utilized to provide more affordable legal information, advice, and
services to middle-class consumers, but those consumers would get the
assistance of a trained lawyer who is focused on their individual
circumstances when necessary and appropriate.
Information
technology services and practicing lawyers would collaborate to
produce an optimal and affordable blend of accessible services.
This consumer-friendly collaboration has not yet emerged and is
less likely to do so under the current regime of exclusive lawyer
ownership of legal service providers. Optimal use of Internet and
computer software technology for the benefit of middle-class legal
consumers will likely require significant capital investment and
comprehensive planning. Because Model Rule 5.4 and its state
counterparts prohibit non-lawyer investment in the legal services
industry, any investment in technology services or integration of
technology with existing legal services must come from within the
profession, from law firm partners, or from their shareholder
counterparts. I"3 The potential for costly technological investment,
especially by lawyers that focus on middle-class clients (mostly small
law firms and solo practitioners), is, therefore, limited.
Permitting access to non-lawyer capital, either through direct access
to equity markets or capital contributions from non-lawyer partners,
could result in the capital infusion necessary for investment in
technology that would help to fill the gap for legal information and
services sought by middle-class consumers."
Efficient use of
technology could help consumers with legal needs connect more easily
with legal service providers, who would tap into the currently
underserved middle-class market for legal services."' Investments in
182. See generally Fischer, supra note 176. A recent celebrated example of the
online "lay legal expert" is one Marcus Arnold. a fifteen-year old boy from Perris,
California who became the number one ranked "law expert" on the AskMe.Com
website in the summer of 2000. See Michael Lewis, Faking It,N.Y. Times, July 15.
2001, § 6, at 32, 35.
183. See John H. Matheson & Peter D. Favorite, Multidisciplinary Practiceand the
Future of the Legal Profession: Consideringa Role for Independent Directors,32 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 577,599 (2001).
184. Adams & Matheson, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing the benefits of allowing
law firms access to equity markets).
185. Integration of legal services with other professional services-truly
multidisciplinary practice-would further increase the efficiencies resulting from this
harnessing of modern information technology. Legal services could be bundled with
related professional services and offered to consumers in an integrated package or
menu. Consider H&R Block's Internet venture, www.hrblock.com, which provides its
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technology by corporate-backed legal service providers would also
allow for faster, more efficient, and more affordable service to those
consumers once the connection was made. Routine questions could
be answered, and routine services provided, largely through software
technology, and consumers with more individualized needs could be
identified through the same technology. The technology is available,
the need is established, and the middle classes are on-line. What is
missing are properly capitalized service providers willing to make the
necessary investment.
Pointing out this potential does not resolve the ethical issues at the
center of the on-going MDP debate; rather, in the context of middleclass consumer needs, it places the issues in a more urgent light.
Certainly this brave new world of integrated, technology-assisted legal
service would pose legitimate ethical concerns. Would individualized
client needs be adequately identified and addressed?
Could
confidentiality be properly established and protected despite the
extended use of technology? Would providers with packaged services
put undue pressure on clients to use services they do not need? And,
of course, the fundamental concern traditionally used to justify the
prohibition on non-lawyer ownership of legal service providers
remains: would non-lawyer owners of such service providers put
undue profit pressure on lawyers that would inhibit their exercise of
independent judgment on behalf of clients? This concern would no
doubt be exacerbated by the very efficiencies that recommend the
proposed new regime, including, one could expect, packaging of legal
services with other services on a prepaid, flat fee, or premium basis.
Those within the profession who have thus far successfully resisted
any erosion of the prohibition on non-lawyer ownership of legal
service providers do so, of course, in the name of consumer
protection. 18 6 The prohibition, they argue, is necessary to protect
lawyers' independent professional judgment and other core values of
the legal profession from the inevitable and irresistible pressure to
compromise those values that would result from non-lawyer
ownership. As demonstrated by the parallel conflict faced by
physicians under the regime of managed care discussed below, those
concerns cannot be dismissed out-of-hand.
Given the current failure of the market to meet the needs of
ordinary consumers of legal services and the apparent role of the
customers with access to tax professionals, investment specialists, or mortgage
brokers, all with one click of the mouse. See H&R Block, at http://www.hrblock.com
(last visited Oct. 19, 2001). Given the increasing presence of the middle classes online, there is every reason to expect H&R Block's customers would take advantage of
its legal services division, if one were permitted.
186. See Testimony of David A. Swankin, Citizen Advocacy Center (Mar. 24,
1999), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/swankin.html ("[T]hose who would retain the
current restrictions do so in the name of consumer protection, when quite the
opposite is the case.").

2001]

ETHICS OFMIDDLE-CLASS ACCESS

prohibition of the non-lawyer ownership of legal service providers in
that failure, however, one must, at a minimum, seriously question the
organized bar's unwillingness to tolerate and regulate that conflict.
What one judge said of the restrictions on the unauthorized practice
of law applies with equal force to the MDP restriction:
There is a point at which an institution attempting to provide
protection to a public that seems clearly, over a long period of time,
not to want it, and perhaps not to need it-there is a point when that
institution must wonder whether it is providing protection or
its will. It must wonder whether it is helping or hurting the
imposing
1 7
public.

Or, put slightly differently, what good are the profession's core values
to those who do not make it through the lawyer's office door?
II. How DOCTORS BECAME CORPORATE EMPLOYEES: THE
PARALLEL, BUT RECENTLY DIVERGING, HISTORY OF THE
PROHIBITION ON NON-PHYSICIAN OWNERSHIP OF MEDICAL
SERVICE PROVIDERS

In its attempts to regulate the ownership of professional service
providers, the medical profession has struggled with the same issues
that face the legal profession, including especially the tension between
affordability and protection of professional autonomy. The medical
profession followed a parallel path of ethical and legal prohibitions
until a crisis of rising costs forced open the medical services
marketplace. For the better part of the twentieth century, the
American Medical Association's ("AMA") code of ethics prohibited
physicians from working for corporations that sold their services to
the public. In striking parallel to the ABA's rationale for adopting
Rule 5.4 and its predecessors, the AMA justified its prohibition on the
basis that allowing corporate control of physicians would jeopardize
their exercise of independent professional judgment in treating
patients. A statutory ban on corporate ownership, known as the
"corporate practice of medicine" doctrine, presented a further
obstacle to corporate ownership.
These ethical and legal prohibitions have crumbled, however, under
mounting political, social, and economic pressure, and today
corporate delivery of medical services is the norm. In an effort to
control mounting health care costs the medical profession made, or
was forced to make, the same "deal with the devil" of corporate
ownership that lurks at the fringe of the MDP debate in the legal
community. That deal was made not so much to increase access to
medical care but to control the cost of that care and its impact on
employer- and government-financed medical insurance plans.
187. In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654
A.2d 1344, 1360-61 (N.J. 1995).
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The medical profession's experience under new ownership provides
us with a glimpse into one alternative future, an opportunity to
observe how corporate ownership can impact the professional-client
relationship. The entry of corporations has indeed slowed the growth
of health care costs but not without a price. That price has been borne
by physicians, who have experienced a decrease in autonomy under
their new bosses, and by patients, who are resentful of corporate
interference in the physician-patient relationship.
A. Early History: Ethical and Statutory Prohibitionson Corporate
Delivery of Medical Services

At the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, for-profit
corporations were involved in the delivery of medical services in two
forms. In the first form, known as "contract practice," corporations88
employed physicians to serve the medical needs of their employees.'
Businesses concentrated in remote areas, such as the mining, lumber,
and railroad industries, found that to attract physicians to the sparsely
settled regions where their employees were concentrated, it was

necessary to offer the inducement of a fixed salary.'89 The second
form, known as "corporate practice," involved for-profit businesses
selling physician services to the public. 9 "Corporate practice" was
particularly popular in Oregon and Washington, where lay-managed
corporations contracted with mining and lumber companies to
provide medical services to employees.1 91 These practices disturbed
some members of the AMA, who had only recently established
92 and saw for-profit
control over the medical services industry'
93
corporations as a threat to that control.

188. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 200-04
(1982).
189. Id. at 201-02.
190. Id. at 204; Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine:An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 445,

456 (1987).
191. Starr, supra note 188, at 204-06.
192. The lot of the physician in the early nineteenth century was not a good one.
See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 190, at 449. Though a great deal of disparity existed
among physicians of the day, many had only a mediocre standard of living, and the
profession's standing in society was low. Id. at 448. Additionally, physicians faced
serious competition for patients from "'irregulars,'-quacks and healing sectarians."
Id. The practice of medicine was considered by many to be an "inferior occupation."
Id. Dissatisfied with their situation, physicians held a national medical convention in
1846 and subsequently formed the AMA. Id. at 449. The AMA set out to improve
the status of its members and to establish the "preeminence of the 'regular' medical
profession." Id. It did so by adopting and enforcing a code of ethics that distinguished
its members from less reputable practitioners, supporting licensing legislation that
limited competition and regulated the quality of its members, and pushing for
educational reform. Id. at 455. By the turn of the twentieth century, the AMA had
"brought public respect and greater financial reward to physicians and established the
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The AMA's original Code of Ethics, promulgated in 1847, made no
mention of the "corporate practice" of medicine, or of lay control of
physician services. From its inception, however, the AMA had made
clear that it was hostile to the "contract" or "corporate" practice of
medicine. In 1869, the AMA's House of Delegates adopted a
resolution recommending "that all contract physicians, as well as
those guilty of bidding for practice at less rates than those established
by a majority of regular graduates of the same locality, be classed as
irregular practitioners."'" The AMA recommended to state societies
in 1872 "[t]hat members of the profession hired ...

for definite,

stipulated wages, by... corporation[s], or any other money-making
institution whatever... are to be classed as irregular practitioners."'"
Again in the 1890s, the AMA issued a statement to the effect that the
contract and corporate practices had "gone too far" and that "too
much of the spirit of trade has found its way into the profession, and
[that] its further encroachment should be resisted-not
encouraged." 196 In 1927, an AMA Judicial Council report stated that
"[t]here is no doubt that the [contract] practice is growing in
frequency and becoming widespread. In fact, it is entering into so
many phases of the practice of medicine as to be a distinct menace to
the stability of our organization. '' 19'
Not everyone was opposed to contract and corporate medical
schemes. The high costs of health care and its unavailability to
persons of moderate means led to the formation of the Committee on
the Costs of Medical Care in 1926, which was comprised of leaders in
medicine, public health, and the social sciences.1 After six years of
study, the committee issued a report concluding that persons of low
and moderate means were underserved by the medical profession.'"
The committee made several recommendations to address this
problem, including the expansion of contract practices through group
prepaid medical practice. '
Nine physician members of the
committee, including the Secretary and Chairman of the AMA and
regular medical profession's virtual control over medical care." id.
193. See id at 458.
194. In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701,897 (1979) (internal quotes omitted).
195. Id. at 897-98 (internal quotes omitted).
196. Id. at 898 (internal quotes omitted).
197. Id (internal quotes omitted).
198. See Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and Emerging
Liability Claims Arising from Utilization Management and Financial Incentive
Arrangements Between Health Care Providersand Payers, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock LJ.
155, 157 n.11 (1997); Theodore N. McDowell, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Amendments: Their Impact on the Present Health Care System, 36 Emory U.
691, 693-94 n.9 (1987).
199. Battaglia, supra note 198, at 157-58 n.11 (noting the committee concluded that
each income segment studied "failed to receive the amount of medical services
necessary for good care"); McDowell, supra note 198, at 693-94 n.9.
200. Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 898.
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the Chairman of the AMA's Judicial Council, issued a minority report
opposing the committee's recommendations.2 1 In 1933, the AMA
House of Delegates endorsed the minority report as "expressive, in
principle, of the collective opinion of the medical profession. ' 2 2 The
following year, the House of Delegates added to its ethics code a
provision which prohibited physicians from working for lay-owned
medical service providers:
It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his professional
attainments or services to any lay body, organization, group or
individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under
terms or conditions which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary
or compensation received to accrue to the lay body or individual
employing him. Such a procedure is beneath the dignity of
professional practice, is unfair competition with the profession at
large, is harmful alike to the profession of medicine
and the welfare
20 3
of the people, and is against sound public policy.
While the format changed over the years, the substance of this
ethical prohibition survived intact until the 1970s. The AMA's
position on lay involvement in the provision of medical services was
straightforward: there must be "no capital formation in medical care
(other than what doctors accumulated) ... and ... if medicine
required any capital that doctors themselves could not provide, it
would have to be contributed'21gratis by the community, instead of by
investors looking for a profit.
State statutes passed at the urging of the medical profession were an
additional barrier to corporate ownership of medical practices. A
small number of states passed legislation explicitly prohibiting
corporations from providing medical services to the public. 20 - More
typically, state courts read a prohibition on corporate practice into
state medical practice acts providing for the licensing of physicians.2 6
Courts reasoned that because a corporation was nonpersonal in
nature, it could not meet the qualifications of the licensure statute
and, therefore, could not practice medicine.2 7 This questionable
201. The minority report stated that "[alny method of furnishing medical care
which degrades the medical profession through unfair competition or inadequate
compensation ... must be condemned." Id. (internal quotes omitted).

202. Id. at 899 (internal quotes omitted).
203. Id. (quoting AMA Principles of Medical Ethics 1934) (internal quotes
omitted).
204. Starr, supra note 188, at 216.
205. See Sara Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, 7
Health Matrix 241 app. A (1997): see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2400 (West Supp.
2001) (stating that a corporation can have no professional rights); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 12-36-134(7) (2001) (prohibiting corporations from practicing medicine).
206. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 190, at 464-65.
207. See Parker v. Board of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1932); People v.
United Med. Serv., Inc., 200 N.E. 157 (Ill. 1936); State v. Winneshiek Co-Op Burial
Ass'n. 22 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1946); People v. Woodbury Dermatological Inst., 85 N.E.
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statutory interpretation was bolstered by policy arguments parallel to
those advanced in favor of the prohibition on non-lawyer ownership
of legal service providers. It was unacceptable for non-professionals
to control a professional's judgment;'~ the profession should not be
made available for commercial exploitation;'0 and a physician's
loyalty would be divided between patient and employer, to the
detriment of the patient. 210 In fact, courts holding that state licensing

statutes prohibited the corporate practice of medicine sometimes cited
In re Co-operative Law, 21 1 the New York case that upheld that state's

ban on the corporate practice of law. 12

The historical parallels between the efforts of the legal and medical

professions to ward off lay ownership of professional service providers
are, thus, quite striking. Like the ABA, the AMA adopted ethical

rules prohibiting its members from working for lay-owned
professional service providers. Like the ABA House of Delegates,
the AMA House of Delegates rejected the recommendation of an
independent commission that it discard this prohibition so that
professional services might reach underserved populations. Like the
legal profession, the medical profession successfully urged passage or
interpretation of statutes prohibiting corporations from "practicing"
in its field. As in the case of the legal profession, these prohibitions
were justified by supporters as necessary to protect professional
independence of judgment.
B. From Physician Control to CorporateControl: The Demise of the
Ethical and Statutory Prohibitionon CorporateOwnership of Medical

Services Providers
For the better part of the twentieth century, the medical profession
succeeded in avoiding competition from lay-controlled medical service
providers. Ethical prohibitions and state statutes combined to lock
physicians into "simple partnership-style practice arrangements."' 213
697 (N.Y. 1908).
208. See People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1938); Bennett v. Indiana
State Bd., 7 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. 1937); People v. Carroll, 264 N.W. 861 (Mich. 1936);
State v. Buhl Optical Co., 2 N.E.2d 601 (Ohio 1936).
209. See Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., 111 F.2d 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1940): Funk
Jewelry Co. v. State, 50 P.2d 945 (Ariz. 1935); Parker v. Board of Dental Exam'rs. 14
P.2d 67 (Cal. 1932); Winberry v. Hallihan, 197 N.E. 552 (II1. 1935); State v. Boren, 219
P.2d 566 (Wash. 1950).
210. State Bd. of Optometry v. Gilmore, 3 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1941); Neill v. Gimbel
Bros., 199 A. 178 (Pa. 1938); State ex rel. Loser v. National Optical Stores Co., 225
S.W.2d 263 (Tenn. 1949); State v. Superior Court, 135 P.2d 839 (Wash. 1943).
211. 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910).
212. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 759 A.2d 894, 899 (NJ. Super. L
Div. 2000); Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337,344 (S.D. 1942).
213. Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A
MultidimensionalAnalysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. Legal
Med. 443,446 (1997).
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Reimbursement was on a fee-for-service basis. Like most lawyers
today, physicians simply provided services and billed their clients
directly for those services.
Even when private insurance for
hospitalization and physician services emerged in the 1930s and soon
became a common workplace benefit,2"4 reimbursement still followed
the fee-for-service model. Physicians simply billed insurance carriers
rather than patients.
The fee-for-service system, which was "virtually set in stone" until
the mid-1960s, benefited physicians tremendously in the short-term. 21 5
Without competition from corporations, physicians enjoyed exclusive,
increasingly lucrative ownership rights in business associations
delivering medical services. Fee-for-service reimbursement, coupled
with the emerging indemnification scheme, resulted in what one
commentator has called an "extraordinarily generous, uncritical
reimbursement system. '216 Physicians had exclusive control over the
method and cost of treating patients and were generally assured of
payment from insurers, who in turn passed along the increasing costs
to employers.2 7 Because "physicians were economically empowered
to define good care with very little outside influence.., medical
routines were largely
a function of what physicians believed their
218
needed.
patients
Not surprisingly, the cost of medical services rose steadily.
Physicians' exclusive ownership rights ensured little or no price
competition among providers of medical services and prevented the
creation of potentially more economical business structures.21 9 The
reimbursement system fueled price inflation by minimizing cost
considerations in physician decision-making and encouraging
maximum use of new and costly medical technologies.220 Perhaps the
straw that broke the back of the fee-for-service system was the federal
government's entry into the medical insurance field in 1965, when it
created the Medicare program to provide public assistance to
individuals over sixty-five years old and the Medicaid program to
extend health coverage to the needy. 221 The creation of Medicare and
Medicaid added fifty million people to the health care market 222 and
214. E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 Am.
J.L. & Med. 79, 80 (1994).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 79.
217. Id. at 80.
218. Id. at 81.
219. In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 917 (1979).
220. Morreim, supra note 214, at 84 n.21.
221. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the
Medical Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 341, 346 (2001). The Medicare and Medicaid
programs were a part of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" election platform in 1964.
See Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and
EnterpriseLiability, 22 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 17 (1996).
222. Kilcullen, supra note 221, at 17.
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forced the federal government to consider the rising costs of medical

services, which had shattered its projections for Medicare and
Medicaid spending.'
With both the federal government and private employers feeling
the pinch of the rising cost of health care insurance, the old system of

fee-for-service reimbursement and physician control over the delivery
of medical services began to crumble. In 1973, Congress passed the
Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") Act. -4 An HMO is the
most common type of managed care organization ("MCO"), which is
a corporation organized to provide and arrange for an array of basic
and supplemental health care services. "The distinguishing
characteristic of an MCO is that the MCO both insures for the cost
and provides for the delivery of health care services to its subscribers,
by either employing physicians or negotiating contractual
relationships with physicians.226 The MCO contracts with the patient,
in exchange for periodic, prepaid premiums, and with physicians, to
deliver the necessary medical services. Typically (and crucially),
223. Between 1967 and 1970 Medicare hospital expenditures rose an average of
18.1% annually, while the overall inflation rate was 5.2%. See id. at 18 n.92 (citing
Karen Davis et al., Health Care Cost Containment 16 (1990)).
224. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,42 U.S.C. § 300e-1 (2001).
225. MCOs vary widely in their "approach, financing, physician involvement, and
philosophy." Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Managed
Care Organizations, 23 J.L. Med. & Ethics 223, 223 (1995). Perhaps the most
important distinction is between for-profit organizations, which trade shares publicly,
and nonprofit organizations, which are governed by the rules of charitable
organizations. Id. For-profit HMOs organize relationships with their physicians in
one of three basic ways: the staff model, the group model, and the independent
practice association ("IPA") model. Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan 1. Maedgen,
Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 Baylor L
Rev. 285, 292 (1995). In a staff model HMO, the corporation employs physicians
directly as salaried employees. Id.; James P. Freiburg, The ABCs of MCOs: An
Overview of Managed Care Organizations,81 I1l. B.J. 584, 586 (1993). In a group
model, the HMO enters into a contract with a group of physicians, who are
independent contractors, to provide medical services to the HMO's members on a
"capitated" basis-that is, the physicians are paid a fixed amount on a monthly basis
for all HMO enrollees assigned to that physician no matter how many enrollees
actually receive treatment. Bearden & Maedgen, supra, at 292; see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.1 (2000). In the IPA model, individual practitioners who contract with HMOs
are reimbursed on a discounted fee-for-service basis, rather than on a capitated basis,
and no periodic limits are imposed on the total fees charged. Freiburg, supra, at 586:
see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.1 (2000).
226. See Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor. How Not To Think About
"Managed Care," 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 661. 669 (1999) ("Perhaps the most
defensible interpretation of 'managed care' is that it represents a fusion of two
functions that once were regarded as largely separate: the financing of medical care
and the delivery of medical services."), Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de lissovoy,
Razing a Tower of Babel" A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance
Plans, 18 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 75, 78 (1993) ("What usually distinguishes the
managed care plans from those that are more traditional is that there is a party that
takes responsibility for integrating and coordinating the financing and delivery of
services across what previously were fragmented provider and payer entities.").
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MCOs reimburse the physician-providers of health care with
negotiated, fixed periodic payments. In passing the HMO Act,
Congress hoped to encourage the spread of corporate medical
providers, and thereby deflate rising health care costs.
The HMO Act was instrumental in breaking down the barriers to
corporate ownership of medical service providers. While the Act did
not explicitly preempt state corporate practice prohibitions, 2 7 it
superseded state laws and practices requiring medical society approval
before physicians could furnish services to HMOs and participate in
the governance of an HMO, and those prohibiting HMOs from
soliciting members through advertising.228 The remainder of the job
was done by the states. Many states took their cue from the federal
government and enacted legislation specifically exempting HMOs
from the corporate practice prohibition.229 Many others simply ceased
enforcing the doctrine, if they had not already done so." While
statutory corporate practice prohibitions are not entirely moribund in

227. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 190, at 482. Some commentators argue that the
HMO Act in fact preempts state corporate practice prohibitions, since Congress could
hardly have allowed the obvious barrier posed by these prohibitions to HMO
development to stand. See Philip C. Kissam & Ronald M. Johnson, Health
Maintenance Organizations and Federal Law: Toward a Theory of Limited
Reformmongering, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 1163, 1218 (1976).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (2001). Section 300e-10(a) states:
In the case of any entity (1) which cannot do business as a health maintenance organization in a State
in which it proposes to furnish basic and supplemental health services
because that State by law, regulation, or otherwise(A) requires as a condition to doing business in that State that a medical
society approve the furnishing of services by the entity,
(B) requires that physicians constitute all or a percentage of its governing
body,
(C) requires that all physicians or a percentage of physicians in the locale
participate or be permitted to participate in the provision of services for the
entity,
(D) requires that the entity meet requirements for insurers of health care
services doing business in that State respecting initial capitalization and
establishment of financial reserves against insolvency, or
(E) imposes requirements which would prohibit the entity from complying
with the requirements of this subchapter, and
(2) for which a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee was made under this
subchapter or which is a qualified health maintenance organization for
purposes of section 300e-9 of this title (relating to employees' health benefit
plans),
such requirements shall not apply to that entity so as to prevent it from
operating as a health maintenance organization in accordance with section
300e of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a).
229. Mars, supra note 205, at 260 app.
230. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 190, at 470; see Lisa Rediger Hayward, Revising
Washington's Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 403, 413
(1996).
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some states, 231 federal and state HMO legislation has effectively
ensured that it no longer stands in the way of systematic health care
reform.
If the statutory prohibitions on corporate ownership of medical
service providers went with something of a whimper, the ethical
prohibitions went with a bang. In 1979, the FTC held that those
prohibitions, as then embodied in Section 6 of the AMA's Principles
of Medical Ethics, 2 violated the antitrust laws."
It ordered the
AMA to modify its ethics code accordingly.'
The AMA had argued that the ethical prohibitions were necessary
to prevent non-physicians from having undue influence over medical
procedures. 235 The FTC dismissed this argument, stating that it was
"difficult to see how such sweeping ethical proscriptions are needed to
prevent.., non-physicians from having undue influence over medical
procedures."'2 6 It concluded in forceful terms that the profession's
ethical concerns could not justify insulating the medical service
industry from the competitive marketplace:
The end result of [the AMA's] energies has been the placement of a
formidable impediment to competition in the delivery of health care
services by physicians in this country. That barrier has served to...
deter the offering of innovative forms of health care and to stifle the
rise of almost every type of health care delivery that could
potentially pose a threat to the income of fee-for-service physicians
in private practice. The costs to the public in terms of less
expensive, or even, perhaps, more improved forms of medical
services are great.
231. One commentator counts five states that, at least in the mid-90s, were actively
enforcing the doctrine. Hayward, supra note 230, at 413. Another commentator has

called the surviving corporate practice prohibitions "legal landmines, remnants of an
old and nearly forgotten war, half-buried on a field fast being built up with new forms
of health care organizations." Arnold S. Rosoff, The Corporate Practiceof Medicine

Doctrine: Has its Time Passed?, 12 Health L. Dig. 1. 3-4 (Supp. Dec. 1984). For a
discussion of the sporadic recent applications of the doctrine, see Chase-Lubitz, supra
note 190, at 470-74.
232. Section 6 of the Principles of Medical Ethics stated that "[a] physician should
not dispose of his services under terms or conditions which tend to interfere with or
impair the free and complete exercise of his medical judgment and skill or tend to
cause a deterioration of the quality of medical care." In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C.
701, 896 (1979). The AMA Judicial Council made it clear that Section 6 prohibited
both certain contract-type practices, and physicians working for for-profit medical
service enterprises. Id. at 896-97. Section 6 listed the types of contract arrangements
considered unethical by the Judicial Council. Id. Opinion 5 of Section 6 prohibited a
physician from "dispos[ing] of his professional attainments or services to any hospital,
corporation or lay body ... under terms or conditions which permit the sale of the
services of that physician by such agency for a fee." Id.
233. Id. at 996-1018.
234. Id. at 701.
235. Id. at 1017.
236. Id. at 1018.
237. Id. at 917.
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The FTC further stated:
To say that physicians are above "trade," and to assert that they are
entitled to preserve their basic ethical values despite deleterious
effects on competition, would be to completely remove physicians
from a marketplace setting, rather than admit that the services they
offer, the delivery of which are both highly necessary and equally
highly respected, might better comport with the public's needs were
they subject to appropriate competitive factors .... 3
Because the AMA's ethical restrictions "tip[ped] the balancing
scales against the needs of the public and in favor of the maintenance
of the financial security of physicians," they were "unfair under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." '39 Quoting the
Supreme Court, the FTC concluded that the fact that "competition is
not entirely conducive to ethical behavior... is not a reason.., for
doing away with competition." 2"
The FTC's cease and desist order, which enjoined the AMA from
restricting participation by non-physicians in the ownership of
businesses offering medical services, was affirmed by the Second
Circuit with minor language modifications and by an equally divided
Supreme Court.241 In 1980, the AMA revised its ethical code and
renamed it the Principles of Medical Ethics. 42 Section 6 of the most
238. Id. at 954.
239. Id. at 956.
240. Id. (quoting National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435

U.S. 679, 696 (1978)).
241. See Am. Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 453 (2d Cir. 1980); Am. Med. Ass'n
v. FTC, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The section of the FTC Order relevant to corporate
ownership of medical services is quoted in full as follows:
It is further Ordered that respondent American Medical Association... do
forthwith cease and desist from:
A. Restricting, regulating, impeding, advising on the ethical propriety of, or
interfering with the consideration offered or provided to any physician in
any contract with any entity that offers physicians' services to the public, in
return for the sale, purchase or distribution of his or her professional
services, except for professional peer review of fee practices of physicians;
B. Restricting, interfering with, or impeding the growth, development or
operations of any entity that offers physicians' services to the public, by
means of any statement or other representation concerning the ethical
propriety of medical service arrangements that limit the patient's choice of a
physician;
C. Restricting, interfering with, or impeding the growth, development or
operations of any entity that offers physicians' services to the public, by
means of any statement or other representation concerning the ethical
propriety of participation by non-physicians in the ownership or
management of said organization; and
D. Inducing, urging, encouraging, or assisting any physician, or any medical
association, group of physicians, hospital, insurance carrier or any other nongovernmental organization to take any of the actions prohibited by this Part.
In re Am. Med. Ass'n, [1979-1983 Transfer Binder: F.T.C. Complaints & Orders]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,955, at 22,418-19 (May 19, 1982).
242. Judicial Council, AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics (1958), available at
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recent (2001) code states that a "physician shall.., be free to choose
whom to serve, with whom
to associate, and the environment in which
243
to provide medical care.
With the ethical and legal barriers to corporate ownership of
medical service providers out of the way, corporate providers quickly
moved to the center of the medical service delivery system. Fewer
than forty HIOs operated in the United States in 1972, with a little
less than three million members.3' By 1985, the number of HMOs

increased to 263, with over eighteen million members, 245 and by 1998
there were fifty-six million Americans enrolled in HMOs.2
Approximately 45% of all U.S. physicians are now under contract
with an MCO.247

C. Impact of Lay CorporateOwnership on Provision of Medical

Services
While there is substantial evidence that the shift to managed care
has successfully slowed the growth of costs in the medical services
industry,2' the new corporate owners have exerted pressure on the
traditional physician-patient relationship. In attempting to drive costs
down and increase profits, corporate medical service providers
"creat[e] conflicting loyalties for the physician... [and] undermine
the physician's fundamental obligation to serve as patient
advocate."249 The AMA has described the resulting conflict of
interests this way:

http:l/www.ama-assn.orgama/upload/mmI369/1957-principles.pdf [hereinafter 1957
Principles].
243. AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics § 6 (2001). available at http:i/www.amaassn.org/ama/upload/mm/369/2001-principles.pdf [hereinafter Revised Principles]
(indicating most recent revisions to the Principlesof Medical Ethics).
244. Tom J. Manos, Take Half an Aspirin and Call Your HMO in the MorningMedical Malpractice in Managed Care: Are HMOs Practicing Medicine Without a
License?, 53 U. Miami L. Rev. 195,202 (1998).
245. Id246. Id.
247. Thomas William Malone & Deborah Haas Thaler, Managed Health Care: A
PlaintiffsPerspective, 32 Tort & Ins. L.J. 123, 125 (1996).
248. Between 1993 and 1997, health care costs stabilized at 13.5% of the gross
domestic product ("GDP"), a substantial enough achievement given that health care
expenditures rose from 8.9% of GDP in 1980 to 12.1% of GDP in 1990. Erica Worth
Harris, The Regulation of Managed Care: Conquering Individualism and Cynicism in
America, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 315, 321 (1999). Health care inflation, which vas
18.6% in 1988, dropped to approximately 2% in 1993. Id. This cost control has
apparently not, however, translated into increased access to medical care. In 1987,
12.9% of the population was uninsured for medical care; that figure had increased to
16.3% in 1998. See Walter L. Stiehm, Poverty Law: Access to Healthcareand Barriers
to the Poor,4 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 279,285 n.24 (2001).
249. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Ethical Issues in Managed
Care, 273 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 330, 331 (1995) [hereinafter Ethical Issues].
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Managed care involves at least two conflicting loyalties for the
physician, conflicts that are not unique to managed care. First,
physicians are expected to balance the interests of their patients with
the interests of other patients. When deciding whether to order a
test or procedure for a patient, the physician must consider whether
the slot should be saved for another patient or not used at all to
conserve the plan's resources. Second, managed care can place the
needs of patients in conflict with the financial interests of their
physicians. Managed care plans use bonuses and fee withholds to
make physicians cost conscious. As a result, when physicians are
deciding whether to order a test, they will recognize that it may have
an adverse impact on their income. 25
Other restrictions imposed by managed care organizations have
included limiting a patient's choice of physician;25 ' prospectively
reviewing physician decisions to ensure the decision was "medically
necessary; "252 rigidly adhering to treatment directives, thereby limiting
physicians in their range of clinical options;25 3 and contractually
limiting information physicians can provide to their patients.5 4
250. Id.
251. First, managed care subscribers are limited in their choice of physician to

those physicians who have contracted with, or are employed by, the MCO. See id. at
330. Second, patient choice is limited because MCOs "deny[] access to... medical
specialists until the subscriber has obtained the approval of a primary care physician."
Id. Third, MCOs impede continuing physician-patient relations when an employer
changes plans, or the employee herself changes jobs. Harris, supra note 248, at 343.
The restrictions on patient choice "prevent[] a trust relationship from being
established between doctor and patient." Id. at 343-44.
252. So-called prospective utilization review involves the use of an independent
review to determine if the treating physician's decision is necessary and cost-effective.
Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians be
Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 Geo. L.J. 1821, 1826 (1995). The use of a

third party to oversee physician decisions is a "direct and visible interference in
[physician] clinical decision-making." Id. at 1830. As another commentator has said,
"[iun managed care's arsenal of cost-control weaponry, probably none is more
potent ...than superseding the physician's autonomy by a managerial-review process
in which armies of claims clerks, administrators,.., and technocrats of every
description insinuate themselves into a complex system that authorizes, delivers, and
pays for medical services." Gerald W. Grumet, Health Care Rationing Through
Inconvenience: The Third Party's Secret Weapon, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 607, 608
(1989).
253. Treatment directives, also known as clinical practice guidelines, are
"systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions
about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances." Arnold J.Rosoff,
The Role of Clinical PracticeGuidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 Health Matrix 369,
370 (1995) (quoting Inst. of Med., Clinical Practice Guidelines: Directions for a New
Program 8 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990)). Developed in response
to observed substantial variations in practice approaches, MCOs have latched on to
treatment directives as yet another cost-control mechanism, and "rigid protocols or
standards of care" are now issued with increasing frequency. Mark A. Hall,
Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost
Containment, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 450-51 (1988); see John D. Ayres, The Use and
Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J. Legal Med. 421, 437 (1994). MCOs may
make adherence to practice guidelines a contractual condition of employment for
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The most fundamental source of conflicts of interest for the

physician is the use of financial incentives in physician compensation
schemes to reduce costs. Whereas the traditional fee-for-service
system encouraged physicians to over-utilize medical services, thereby
increasing health care costs, the modern compensation system
provides incentives to physicians in various ways to under-utilize
medical services, thereby decreasing health care costs, with a resulting
increase in the HMOs' bottom line. The use of financial incentives is
fast becoming the norm. By the mid-90s, more than 60% of HMOs
utilized compensation schemes that placed physicians at some
personal financial risk when making clinical decisions.-- HMOs
utilize financial incentives in a "seemingly infinite variety of ways," all
with the purpose of influencing physicians in their clinical decision
making. 16 Three commonly used financial incentives are capitation
schemes, bonuses, and withholding schemes. 2'
physicians or deny reimbursement for treatment decisions going beyond the
guidelines. See Ayres, supra, at 437; Hall, supra.at 450 n.66.
254. A major controversy erupted in the mid-1990s over the use by MCOs of socalled "gag clauses," provisions in MCO-physician contracts which limit the
physician's discretion in providing certain information to patients. See Joan H.
Krause, The Brief Life of the Gag Clause: Why Antigag Clause Legislation Isn't
Enough, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1999). MCO use of gag clauses led to a swift political
response, and by 1999 almost every state had passed legislation banning the use of gag
clauses in MCO contracts. Id. at 2. Subtler restrictions on physician-patient
communication still exist, however.
MCOs may employ de facto unwritten
restrictions on the discussion of certain treatment options. See id. at 13. MCOs may
also utilize the "termination without cause" clauses that are common in MCOphysician contracts to prohibit physician disclosure. Id. at 13-14. Indeed, the General
Accounting Office ("GAO") has stated that "it is the contractual relationship itselfits short duration and provision for termination without cause-that may make
physicians feel constrained from speaking entirely openly with their patients." Id.
(quoting U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO/HEHS-97-175, Managed Care:
Explicit Gag Clauses Not Found in HMO Contracts, But Physician Concerns Remain
(1997)). Finally, in giving physicians financial incentives to under-treat patients, or
otherwise avoid costly treatment, MCOs can expect physicians to "internalize the
incentive structure and impose their own restrictions on interactions with patients."
Id.
255. Stephen R. Latham. Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to
Physicians,22 Am. J.L. & Med. 399,406 (1996).
256. Id. at 402.
257. In a capitation system. the HMO remunerates a participating primary care
physician at a flat rate for each enrolled patient for a specific period of time. Allison
Faber Walsh, Note, The Legal Attack on Cost Contaimnent Mechanisms: The
Expansion of Liabilityfor Physiciansand Managed Care Organizations,31 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 207, 218 (1997). Physicians are paid a pre-determined rate based on the
number of subscribers to the plan and receive the same amount of money per
payment period regardless of the services provided to patients, or the costs of those
services. Id. If a subscriber has no need for medical services in the payment period,
the physician nonetheless receives his fixed payment. Id. Likewise, if a patient
requires medical service in excess of the amount contracted for, no additional
payment is given, and the physician must "take the loss" on the difference. Id.
Bonuses reward cost-effective physicians in a variety of ways, taking into
account factors such as physician cost-effectiveness, physician time, patient
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While there is to date little evidence that financial incentives

employed by managed care organizations have had a negative impact
on the quality of care received by patients,2 s the common public
perception is to the contrary. Media horror stories of shoddy
treatment at the hands of HMO bureaucrats are legion, and fuel this
perception. 259 Not surprisingly, consumers who read sensational news
accounts come to believe that managed care endangers the quality of
the care they receive.2" This perception, regardless of its accuracy,
undermines the traditional physician-patient relationship, based as it
is on trust. Patients now "know" that treatment determinations are
no longer a matter just between themselves and their physician, but
are also a matter of some importance for the managed care
corporation. Whether it be treatment directives, utilization review,
gag clauses, or the myriad of financial incentives their treating

physicians face, patients are all too aware of a corporate presence in
their doctor's office.

encounters and satisfaction, and malpractice history. Latham, supra note 255, at 403.
One study found that in 1996, approximately 40% of California physicians had bonus
clauses in their managed care contracts. Kevin Grumbach et al., Primary Care
Physicians' Experience of Financial Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 New
Eng. J. Med. 1516, 1516 (1998).
Under a withholding scheme, the HMO withholds a percentage of the
capitated payment or fee and places it into a risk pool which "acts as a buffer, insuring
that the total amount set aside for patient care under the plan is not exceeded."
Latham, supra note 255, at 404. If any funds remain at the end of the payment period,
they are distributed to the participating physicians. Id. The existence of a pool of
withheld funds provides physicians with an incentive to keep costs low, so that they
can take advantage of the distribution. See id.
258. In 1992, the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") reported that
no researcher has found "a link between the quality of care provided under the
Medicare and Medicaid programs and the structure of physician incentive plans," nor
is any link established between increased morbidity and mortality rates among
managed care patients compared with fee-for-service patients. Latham, supra note
255, at 407 n.84 (quoting HCFA Proposed Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024, 59,026
(1992)). A 1987 study of more than 1500 individuals who were randomly assigned to
either an HMO or to a traditional fee-for-service insurance plan concluded that while
the HMO costs were lower than the fee-for-service plan, there were "no significant
differences in health between individuals in the two plans three years after the study
began." David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 5 Health Matrix 141, 162 (1995).
259. See, e.g., Jay Greene, Family Sues HMO for Torture for Denying Care,
Charleston Gazette, June 13, 1997, LEXIS, The Charleston Gazette; David S.
Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds Over Managed Care: Frustrated Consumers Push for
Tougher Laws, Wash. Post, June 30, 1997, at Al; David R. Olmos, Texas Regulators
Assail Kaiser on Physicians, Care, L.A. Times, Apr. 24, 1997, at Dl; Robert Pear,
Expense Means Many Can't Get Drugs for AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1997, at Al;
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Patientswith Difficult Illnesses Fight New H.M.O. 's to Get Help,
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1996, at Al.
260. John V. Jacobi, Patientsat a Loss: ProtectingHealth Care Consumers Through
Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 705, 714 (1997).
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IV. ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT IN THE FACE OF PROFIT PRESSURES FROM CORPORATE
MEDICAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

In response to the new pressures placed on physicians' previously
insulated independence of judgment, the medical profession has
adopted standards addressing the physician's ethical duties in the era
of managed care and corporate medical providers. While those
standards have no force of law, they are a condition of AMA
2
membership, and a physician can be expelled for noncompliance. '
More significantly, courts have held physicians to the same standards
in the corporate era as they were held to in the professional era,
making it clear that a physician's primary duty is still to patients and
not to their corporate employers. 26 "The MCO made me do it" is not
a permissible defense to substandard professional care. And perhaps
most importantly, though complicated and encumbered by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
preemption and the corporate medical prohibition itself, courts have
held MCOs vicariously liable for physician malpractice, thus providing
MCOs with an incentive not to interfere in the professional judgment
of their employee physicians to the detriment of patients.' b3
A. The New Ethical Rules
The ethical response in the medical profession to the threats to
physician autonomy posed by the new regime of managed care and
corporate ownership has been somewhat equivocal. To a degree, the
medical profession's response has been to acknowledge that costcontainment and corporate control are simply a fact of professional
life and to embrace their virtues. - In acknowledgment of the FTC
ruling, the AMA's revised Principles of Medical Ethics and Current
Opinions both reiterate that member physicians are free to enter into
any type of employment relationships they wvish.2t The AMA's Code

261. In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 803 (1979).
262 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
263. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
264. See Agrawal, supra note 221, at 408 ("Professional standards have evolved to
acknowledge the legitimacy of cost considerations in clinical decisions.").
265. See Revised Principles, supra note 243, Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, AMA, Current Opinions, E-8.05 ("The contractual relationships that
physicians assume when they... agree to provide services to the patients of an
insurance plan are varied. Income arrangements may include hourly wges[,]...
annual salaries[,J... and share[s] of group income.... Arrangements also usually
include a range of fringe benefits...."). The Current Opinions herein cited are
available at the American Medical Association's website at either http'J/www.
Ama-assn.org/apps/pfLonline/pf online?Ln=browse&do=-policyfilesE-8.00.HTM
(last visited Oct. 18, 2001) or http://vww.ama-assn.orglappsfpLonlinelpLonline?fn

=browse&doc=policyfiles/E-2.00.HTM (last visited Oct. 18,2001).
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of Ethics ("the AMA Code")2" actually extols the benefits of
capitation, the most vilified tool of the new corporate owners.

Another provision warns physicians to be "conscious of costs.""z In
fact, the AMA Code specifically addresses the ethical obligations of
physicians in management positions and physicians
who now work as
269
medical directors for managed care organizations.
The only provision in the AMA Code that directly addresses the
problem of lay interference states that "physicians should not be
subjected to lay interference in professional medical matters and their
primary responsibility should be to the patients they serve." 70 In
various other provisions, the AMA reaffirms the primacy for
physicians of their patients' interests. In June 2001, the AMA revised
its Principles of Medical Ethics for just the fourth time in history,
adding a new principle that states, "[a] physician shall, while caring for
a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount."27
Specifically addressing the threat posed by MCOs, Opinion 8.13 states
that "[t]he duty of patient advocacy is a fundamental element of the
physician-patient relationship that should not be altered by the system
of health care delivery in which physicians practice. Physicians must
continue to place the interests of their patients first. '27 2 Physicians in
management positions are likewise told to "put the needs of patients
first; 273 though physicians should be "conscious of costs,"
nonetheless, "concern for the quality of care
the patient receives
2 74
should be the physician's first consideration.
266. There are four components to the AMA's Code of Ethics: (1) The Principles
of Medical Ethics, (2) Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship,
(3) The Reports of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, and (4) The Current
Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. See AMA, Code of Medical
Ethics and CEJA Reports, at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/2503.html
(last visited Nov. 4, 2001). The Principles of Medical Ethics is much like a
constitution, and the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs develops the meaning of
the principles in its opinions. Each opinion of the Council is keyed to a certain
Principle.
267. See E-8.051 ("The application of capitation to physicians' practices can result
in the provision of cost-effective, quality medical care.").
268. Id. E-2.09.
269. Id. E-8.02, E-8.021. A medical director is a physician "employed by thirdparty payers in the health care delivery system... or by entities that perform medical
appropriateness determinations on behalf of payers." Id. E-8.021.
Physicians
functioning as medical directors are warned that whenever they make decisions
affecting individual or group patient care, "they are functioning within the
professional sphere of physicians and must uphold ethical obligations, including those
articulated by the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics." Id.
270. Id. E-8.05.
271. Revised Principles, supra note 243. The other revisions were made in 1912,
1957, and 1980. Tanya Albert, AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics May be Infused
with New "Lofty Ideas," Am. Med. News, Jan. 1/8, 2001, http://ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick-0l/prsaOlOl.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2001).
272. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Current Opinions, E-8.13.
273. Id. E-8.02.
274. Id. E-2.09.
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Elsewhere, however, the AMA Principles assert that "physicians
have an obligation to consider the needs of broader patient
populations within the context of the patient-physician
relationship."275 The AMA Code does not specifically address how
physicians are to reconcile the new ethic of "socially conscious"
decision-making with the old ethic of fidelity to patients first.-"
In the new era of limited medical resources, physicians may be
asked to make allocation decisions. The AMA's position on this issue
is clear: don't allocate, advocate. Since the physician's first duty is to
the patient, the "treating physician must remain a patient advocate
and therefore should not make allocation decisions."'
Allocation
decisions should be made "at a policy making level so that individual
physicians are not asked to engage in bedside rationing."-" The
AMA also calls for "[a]dequate appellate mechanisms for both
patients and physicians...
to address disputes regarding medically
279
necessary care.

With regard to financial incentives and resulting conflicts of
interest, the AMA approach is to avoid an outright ban on such
incentives and, instead, "manage and minimize" the threat those
incentives pose. Because "[u]nder no circumstances may physicians
place their own financial interests above the welfare of their
patients," 1 the AMA has made "financial incentives... permissible
only if they promote the cost-effective delivery of health care and not
the withholding of medically necessary care."'
Physicians are
cautioned to "evaluate the financial incentives.., before contracting
with [the HMO].... to ensure that the quality of patient care is not
compromised."'
If the compensation scheme calls for capitation,
physicians are told to "seek agreements.., that provide sufficient
financial resources for all necessary care" and not to "assume
inordinate levels of financial risk."' The AMA lays out a number of
factors for physicians to consider when entering into a contractual
arrangement, such as "[tihe size of the plan and the time period over

which the rate is figured,"'

and cautions physicians to "[cjalculat[e]

275. Id. E-8.054.
276. In a subtle shift of emphasis, the AMA recently revised its Principles of
Medical Ethics, replacing language stating that "'the responsibilities of the physician
extend not only to the individual, but also to society" with "a physician must
recognize responsibility to patients first and foremost, as well as to society." Revised
Principles, supra note 243; 1957 Principles, supra note 242.
277. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Current Opinions E-2.03.
278. Id. E-8.13(2)(a).
279. Id. E-8.13(2)(d).
280. Id. E-8.03.
281. Id. E-8.13(3).
282. Id. E-8.054(2).
283. Id. E-8.051(1)-(2).
284. Id. E-8.051(2); see also id. E-8.054 (describing factors physicians should use to
evaluate compensation packages so as to ensure correct incentives and avoid
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incentive payments according to the performance of a sizable group of
physicians rather than on an individual basis. 'zs5 The AMA puts the
onus firmly on physicians to consider their contractual relations and
their compensation arrangement with managed care plans so as to
avoid financial incentives that may jeopardize patient care.
The disclosure rules the AMA has adopted in the face of managed
care cut in two separate directions. First, with respect to disclosure of
treatment options not covered by the plan, physicians have a simple,
straightforward, affirmative duty to disclose such options: "The
physician's obligation to disclose treatment alternatives to patients is
not altered by any limitations in the coverage provided by the
patient's managed care plan." 6 'Second, with respect to the
physician's financial incentives, the AMA's ethics code places the
onus on the managed care organization,not the physician, to disclose
such incentives to the patient.2 Physicians have no affirmative duty

under the ethics rules to inform patients of the potential conflict
associated with their compensation. Rather, they "must be prepared
to discuss with patients any financial arrangements that could impact
patient care."I The AMA places the onus for incentive disclosure on
the managed care organizations, entities over which it has no
authority, on the rationale that it is 2better
that "patients are aware of
9
such incentives priorto enrollment.

The AMA's response to managed care's threat to professional
independence of judgment is thus something of a compromise.
Commentators have criticized that response because it appears to
leave unresolved the physician's ethical role in the corporate era.29 °
But perhaps the biggest problem with looking to the AMA to ensure
professional independence of judgment is jurisdictional: the AMA
conflicts).
285. Id. E-8.13(3)(b).
286. Id. E-8.13(2)(f); see also id. E-8.132 ("If the... HMO does not permit
referral... when the physician believes that the patient's condition requires such
services, the physician should so inform the patient so that the patient may decide
whether to accept the outside referral at his or her own expense ... ").
287. See id. E-8.13(3)(a). "Any incentives to limit care must be disclosed fully to
patients by plan administratorsupon enrollment and at least annually thereafter." Id.
(emphasis added). "Patients must be informed of financial incentives that could
impact the level or type of care they receive. This responsibility should be assumed
by the health plan to ensure that patients are aware of such incentives prior to
enrollment." Id. E-8.054(4) (emphasis added).
288. Id. E-8.054(4).
289. Id. (emphasis added); see also AMA Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs,
Financial Incentives and the Practice of Medicine 4 (Dec. 1997), http://www.amaassn.org/amal/up.PDF (on file with the Fordham Law Review) ("A compelling
argument can be made for disclosure prior to enrollment in a health plan, as the
structure of financial inducements could influence the patient's decision to purchase a
specific form of coverage.").
290. Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics,
Hastings Center Rep., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28.
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can regulate physicians but not their corporate employers, the

interfered-with party, but not the interferer.
B. Legal Liability as a Means of Ensuring ProfessionalIndependence
of Judgment

While primarily concerned with properly compensating victims of
inadequate care, liability rules also play a vital role in enforcing
professional standards in the corporate era. 91 Medical malpractice
law requires physicians to "use the knowledge, skill and care
ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in
good standing."2' When a physician fails to meet that standard, she is
liable for any resulting harm.293 Some have argued that, because
physicians no longer exercise unilateral resource control in the health
care industry, the standard of care should be adjusted accordingly.?
The prevailing view, however, reflected in the developing case law, is
that both physicians and corporate medical providers that employ
them should be held legally responsible for failing to meet the
required professional standards.2 95 Rather than attempt to create new
standards for the new system, the traditional principles of medical
malpractice already in place, if applied to physicians and institutions
alike, should ensure adequate professional standards. Imposing
vicarious liability on corporations for interfering with a physician's
independent professional judgment to the detriment of a patient will
provide them with an incentive to avoid such interference.
1. Physician Liability
In the corporate era, at least some courts have held that "the MCO
made me do it" is not a defense to physician negligence.-' Physicians
291. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to
Assure the Quality of Health Care,25 Hous. L. Rev. 525 (1988). Jost described:
Professionals and institutions who deliver care that deviates from the
standard of adequate care established by the profession and that results in
injury to patients face retrospective review that may result in the forced
payment of money damages. By forcing providers themselves to pay costs
caused by their mistakes, the malpractice system in theory requires them to
take all precautions that cost less than the cost that lack of precaution would
impose on others.
Id. at 572.
292. Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 32, at 187 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser].
293. See id
294. See Bernard Friedland, Managed Care and the Erpanding Scope of Primary
Care Physicians' Duties: A Proposalto Redefine Explicitly the Standard of Care, 26
J.L. Med. & Ethics 100 (1998); E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits:
Restructuringthe Legal Standard of Care,59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 21-22 (1997).
295. Gerald B. Hickson, Conwnentary: Don't Let Primary Care Physicians Off the
Hook So Easily, 26 J.L. Med. & Ethics 113, 114 (1998) (arguing that "all parties
engaged in health services delivery... [should] share risk for any adverse outcome").
296. Id. at 113.
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employed by MCOs are held to the same standard of care and the
same tort
liability as traditional physicians, "regardless of the HMO
297
policy.,
Wickline v. State9 8 is illustrative.
In Wickline the physician
requested approval from the MCO for an extended eight-day postsurgery hospital stay for his patient. Instead, the MCO approved only
a four-day extension. The physician did not protest the denial and
wrote the discharge order for his patient on the day specified by the
MCO. As a result of the early release, the patient's condition
deteriorated, and eventually her leg had to be amputated. The
plaintiff sued the MCO, alleging that the MCO's decision denying a
longer hospital stay caused her injuries. The court held that the MCO
was not liable. In dicta, it pointed the finger squarely at the treating
physician:
[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limitations
imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates
otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's
care. He cannot point to the health care payor as the liability
scapegoat when the
2 99 consequences of his own determinative medical
decisions go sour.
The court went on to scold the physician for his failure to contest
the MCO's determination:
There is little doubt that [the physician] was intimidated by the
[MCO] but he was not paralyzed by [the MCO's] response nor
rendered powerless to act appropriately if other action was required
under the circumstances. If, in his medical judgment, it was in his
patient's best interest that she remain in the ...hospital ...beyond
the extended time period originally authorized by [the MCO], [the
physician] should have made some effort to keep [the patient] there.
He himself acknowledged that responsibility to his patient.",
Thus, similar to ethical standards later adopted by the AMA,"' the
Wickline court would place a burden on the MCO physician to
advocate for the patient in the face of limitations on care imposed by
the MCO.
Relying on the doctrine of informed consent, 301 plaintiffs have
attempted with little success to impose on physicians an affirmative
297. Robert A. Clifford, Physicians' Liability in a Managed Care Environment,
Health Law., Oct. 1997, at 5; see Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1645 (1986);
Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 832 (Wyo. 1998).
298. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986).
299. Id. at 1645.
300. Id. at 1645-46.
301. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
302. The doctrine of informed consent is premised on the idea that every person
has the right to determine what shall be done to her own body; it requires physicians
to inform patients of the risks involved in a proposed treatment. See Prosser, supra
note 292, at 190.
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duty to disclose their financial incentives to undertreat patients. In
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court held:
[A] physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the
patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect the
physician's professional judgment; and (2) a physician's failure to
disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of action for

performing medical
procedures without informed consent or breach
3
of fiduciary duty. 0
Courts have been reluctant, however, to apply this doctrine to
require disclosure of financial incentives in managed care contracts
with physicians. In Ching v. Gaines, for example, the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant-physician had breached his fiduciary duty by failing
to disclose information concerning financial incentives in the
physician's compensation arrangements that provided him with a
disincentive to treat the patient.' ° Despite Moore, the court held that
the physician had no duty to disclose those financial incentives.Some plaintiffs have attempted to introduce evidence that a
physician's care decision was motivated by his own financial interest
as proof of malice justifying an award of punitive damages.' In Bush
v. Dake, a Michigan court held that the question of whether a
financial incentive provided by an MCO caused a physician to provide
inadequate care, thereby committing malpractice, was a fact question
for the jury. 7 Most courts have, however, rejected this theory of
relevance,3° particularly where the physician denies that financial
incentives affected the decision in question. "
Since the HMO Act of 1973 specifically provides for incentive
schemes, 10 some courts are reluctant to consider the impact of
303. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,483 (Cal. 1990) (emphasis
added).
304. See Walsh, supra note 257, at 236-38 (summarizing Ching v. Gaines, No. CV137656 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 1995)).
305. See id. at 237.
306. See Bearden & Maedgen. supra note 225. at 346.
307. William A. Chittenden, III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care:
History and Prognosis, 26 Tort & Ins. L.J. 451, 481 (1991) (summarizing Bush v.
Dake, No. 86-25767 NM-2, slip. op. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Saginaw County Apr. 27, 1989)).
308. See, e.g., Sweede v. CIGNA Healthplan, 1989 WL 12608 (Del. Super. Feb. 2,
1989) (granting physician's motion for summary judgment on issue of punitive
damages); Madsen v. Park Nicollet Med. Ctr., 419 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (finding trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding evidence of financial
incentive because evidence "was only marginally relevant, and potentially very
prejudicial").
309. See, e.g., Sweede v. CIGNA Healthplan, 1989 WL 12608 (Del. Super. Feb. 2,
1989).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(2)(D) (1994) (allowing qualifying HMOs to "make
arrangements with physicians... to assume all or part of the financial risk on a
prospective basis for the provision of basic health services by the physicians"); see also
Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
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financial incentives on physician decision-making where Congress has
specifically allowed for them. Evidence of financial incentives may
also be excluded on the basis that it is more prejudicial than probative.
In a recent malpractice case in Minnesota, an appellate court upheld
the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of financial incentives

because "the voluminous evidence on managed care and the
respective financial risks... (was] the type of evidence that would
'
confuse, mislead, and prejudice a jury."311

2. Corporate Liability
Whether an MCO can be held liable for the malpractice of its
physicians has been a major battleground in the new era of corporate
medical care. A large body of academic commentary has endorsed
vicarious liability for MCOs.31 2 Some commentators have argued that

only the threat of liability will provide MCOs with sufficient incentive
to foster professionalism among their physician ranks and not
jeopardize patient welfare by overriding the professional judgments of
member physicians. 313 It is contended that enterprise liability would
31 4
give MCOs an incentive to rationalize cost-containment measures,
and that MCOs not subject to liability would have no incentive
whatever "to consider the likelihood that MCO policies might
contribute to negligent physician decision-making and patient
'
injury. 315

As a policy justification for imposing tort liability on corporate
providers, commentators have also pointed out that corporate
providers are better positioned than physicians to address systemic
problems such as the information defects that give rise to many
("[T]he use of... 'incentive' plans is not only recommended by professional
organizations.., but... they are specifically required by section 300e of the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.").
311. Shea v. Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130, 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
312. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and
the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 381 (1994);
Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further
Reflections, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 333 (1993); William S. Brewbaker, III, Medical
Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Quality, 60
Law & Contemp. Probs. 117 (1997); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability:
Relocating Responsibilityfor the Quality of Medical Care, 26 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 8
(2000); William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care
System, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 159 (1997) [hereinafter Sage, Emerging Managed
Health]; William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and
Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 1 (1994).
313. Havighurst, supra note 312, at 20.
314. Brewbaker, supra note 312, at 135; see also Petrovich v. Share Health Plan,
Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 764 (Ill. 1999) ("HMO accountability is essential to
counterbalance the HMO goal of cost-containment. To the extent that HMOs are
profit-making entities, accountability is also needed to counterbalance the inherent
drive to achieve a large and ever-increasing profit margin.").
315. Brewbaker, supra note 312, at 135.
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malpractice claims.316

829

Liability may also encourage MCOs to hire

physicians with
the best credentials rather than those that come at the
317

lowest cost.
Accountability and fairness also argue for liability by
the corporate provider. Since corporate providers have typically

assumed a certain amount of control over medical management
decisions, they should be asked to bear the cost of decisions -that result
in deviations from the established standard of medical care. Is
Patients seeking to hold MCOs liable for harm resulting from
negligent care, however, face several substantial obstacles."' The
largest stumbling block is federal preemption of state law claims due
to ERISA, a comprehensive statute designed to regulate the creation
and administration of employee benefit and pension plans."'
ERISA's definition of an employee welfare benefit plan includes
plans established by an employer to provide medical care or benefits
to its employees.321 ERISA preempts state law causes of action that
"relate to" any employee benefit plan covered by the statute.'

MCOs have effectively utilized ERISA preemption as an affirmative
defense to many state law liability claims.3"

The Supreme Court

recently narrowed ERISA preemption for MCOs, however, when it
held in Pegram v. Herdrich that only "pure eligibility" decisions, as
opposed to treatment decisions, or "mixed" eligibility decisions, are
preempted by ERISA.3 24 This holding appears to pave the way for
most state law claims alleging that MCOs improperly denied care.'
316. See id.; Sage, Emerging Managed Health, supra note 312, at 167.
317. See Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768NH, 1991 WL 277590, at °4 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 17, 1991).
318. See Donald M. Berwick et al., Curing Health Care: New Strategies for Quality
Improvement 12 (1990) ("The doctor no longer really controls health care....
[clontrol is shifting, structure is shifting, the pattern of care is shifting..
319. We are speaking here only of common law liability, and not liability under
state or federal statutes, which further complicates the liability picture. Texas's law
became "the first... in the nation [to] allow[] individuals to sue health maintenance
organizations" and others may soon follow. See Christine Lockhart. The Safest Care is
to Deny Care: Implications of Corporate Health Insurance. Inc. v. Texas Department
of Insurance on HMO Liability in Texas, 41 S.Tex. L. Rev. 621 (2000); see also Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. title 24-A, § 4313 (West 2000) (creating private right of action against
health plans). MCOs may well soon be liable for delivering substandard care under
federal law. See Greg Miller, House OKs Patients' Rights Bill, LA. Times, Aug. 3.
2001, at Al. The so-called patients' bill of rights movement is not necessarily an
unwelcome development in MCO boardrooms, however, as the bill that passed the
house places strict caps on damages, as do some state statutes. See, e.g., title 24-A, §
4313 (limiting noneconomic damages to $400,000 and disallowing punitive damages).
320. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
321. § 1002(1)(A).
322. "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter.., shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ....
" § 1144(a).
323. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (finding ERISA
preempts New York human rights law).
324. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,228 (2000).
325. See Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for
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ERISA is not, however, the only obstacle to imposing liability on
MCOs. Mandatory arbitration clauses, prevalent in MCO contracts,
have effectively channeled many health care disputes into private
arbitration fora and out of the court system, impeding the doctrinal
development of MCO liability in the courts.326 In addition, a handful
of states have statutorily immunized MCOs from malpractice
liability.3" 7 A final obstacle, ironically enough, is the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine in those few states that have not yet
abolished the doctrine. A small number of courts have granted
summary judgment to MCOs in malpractice cases on the illogical basis
that a corporation could not possibly be liable for the malpractice of a
profession that it is statutorily barred from practicing.32
Despite these obstacles, corporate providers have been exposed to
common law liability in a host of guises. 329 Most commonly, courts
have found MCOs liable for physician negligence that results in harm
to patients on a theory of vicarious liability.33 Precisely what

Breach of FiduciaryDuty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption
for State Law Liabilityfor Medical CareDecision Making, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
326. Corporations generally prefer arbitration over the court system, since
arbitration involves "reduced litigation costs and a perceived immunity from
sympathy-induced punitive damages awards." Chittenden, supra note 307, at 494.
Federal regulations, and most state MCO statutes require MCOs to maintain
administrative dispute resolution procedures. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.124(g) (2000). Even
though arbitration is a creature of contract, and no party is required to submit to
arbitration, the Supreme Court has held that questions regarding a party's intent to
arbitrate a dispute are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. See AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986); Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). State efforts to protect consumers
from odious arbitration clauses have been struck down under the Supremacy Clause
as violative of the Federal Arbitration Act. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
327. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 27-21A-23(d) (1975) ("No person participating in the
arrangements of a health maintenance organization other than the actual provider of
health care.., shall be liable for negligence, misfeasance, nonfeasance or malpractice
in connection with the furnishing of such services and supplies."); N.J. Stat. § 26:2J-25
(1996) (exempting anyone "participating in the arrangements of a health maintenance
organization" other than the actual providers from liability for "negligence,
misfeasance, nonfeasance or malpractice").
328. See Propst v. Health Maint. Plan, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1142 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990);
Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). But see
Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
329. There are a host of articles discussing the various theories of liability for
MCOs. See, e.g., Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 225; Chittenden, supra note 307;
Domenick C. DiCicco, Jr., HMO Liability for the Medical Negligence of Member
Physicians,43 Vill. L. Rev. 499 (1998); Malone & Thaler, supra note 247; William E.
Milks, Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) for Negligence of
Member Physicians, 51 A.L.R. 5th 271 (2000); Lisa Panah, Common Law Tort
Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations,29 J. Health & Hosp. L. 146 (1996);
David L. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today: Laws, Cases, Theories, and
CurrentIssues, 33 J. Health L. 191 (2000).
330. See DiCicco, supra note 329, at 506.
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"version" of vicarious liability is employed has depended in part on
-'
the form of the defendant MCO.33
The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that an employer may
be held liable for the negligence of an employee if the employee acted
in the course and scope of his employment.3 2 To successfully prevail,
a plaintiff must show the employer effectively controlled the
employee in the performance of the employee's job."3' Staff model
HMOs, which employ physicians directly, provide the best targets for
plaintiffs relying on respondeat superior. -' In Sloan v.Metropolitan
Health Council, for example, plaintiffs brought an action against a
staff model HMO for the negligence of its physician-employee 33- The
HMO provided its physicians an annual salary and fringe benefits
pursuant to written employment contracts, and the physicians in its
employ were not permitted to maintain an independent practice
without the HMO's permission.336 The trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendant HMO, holding that a HMO could not be
liable for the malpractice of a physician in its employment.' - The
appellate court disagreed, finding that because the HMO's medical
director "policed medical services and established policy" and because
the medical director's judgment was final, the requisite degree of
control existed; a claim of vicarious liability could, therefore, be
maintained against the HMO.3 Similarly, in Gugino v. Harvard Community Health Plan, the

Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a health plan may be
vicariously liable for a physician-employee's malpractice. 31v The plan
could be held liable so long as there was a "factual basis for inferring
that the [p]lan had power of control or direction over the conduct" of

331. See supra note 225 (discussing various forms of HMOs).
332 See Prosser, supra note 292, at 499-500.
333. Id. at 501 (listing the many factors to be taken into account in determining the
existence and degree of control).
334. See Chittenden. supra note 307, at 455 ("The staff model HMO, which
employs its physicians on a salaried basis and often provides its own medical facilities,
fulfills most of the 'master-servant' relationship requirements.").
335. 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
336. Id. at 1105.
337. Id. at 1106.
338. Id. at 1109. The defendant HMO argued that it could not possibly have
controlled the physician, because the physician was exercising his independent
professional judgment. The court found:
[N]o logical basis for denying liability ... on the ground that the professional

must exercise a professional judgment that the principal may not properly
control.... [Tihe touchstone of the principal's liability for the tortious acts
of his agent is merely whether they are done within the course and scope of
the employment.
Id.
339. Gugino v. Harvard Cmty. Health Plan, 403 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Mass. 1980).
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the physician.340 The court's job was made easier in Gugino because
the defendants conceded the physician was their employee."4
In one unusual case, Schleier v. Kaiser FoundationHealth Plan, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a staff
model HMO could be vicariously liable for the actions of a negligent
physician based on the theory of respondeat superior, even though the
physician was an independent contractor.42 The court found that the
requisite control existed because the contracting physician was
engaged by an HMO-employed physician who had "some ability to
control [the consultant's] behavior in that
he answered to [plaintiff's]
343
primary care-taker, a[n] [HMO] doctor."

More commonly, however, when the negligent physician is an
independent contractor, as in a group model HMO or an IPA, the
plaintiff must rely on a theory of ostensible agency.4 4 Ostensible
agency arises when a principal represents or creates the appearance
that a person is the principal's agent, and a third party reasonably
relies on that representation. 345 To make out a valid ostensible agency
claim against an MCO, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) the
patient "look[ed] to the institution rather than the individual

physician for care" and (2) "the hospital [held] out the physician as its
employee. "346

In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, for example, the plaintiff
sued a group model HMO for the negligence of a contracting
physician on a theory of vicarious liability by way of ostensible
agency. 347 The trial court granted summary judgment to the
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
343. Id. at 177.
344. But see Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding group
model HMO liable under respondeat superior theory because "the overall control
exercised by the HMO over... physician[] clearly caused [the physician] to be...
actually.., the agent of the HMO"), rev'd on other grounds, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J.
1995).
345. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 (1965). Section 429 states:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are
being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such
services, to the same extent as though the employer were supplying them
himself or by his servants.
Id. Section 267 of the Second Restatement of Agency states:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such
apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by
the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as
if he were such.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1958).
346. Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
347. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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defendant, and the appellate court reversed. -" The appeals court
found several issues of triable fact bearing on the issue of whether the
negligent physician was the ostensible agent of the HMO, including
the allegations that the HMO's promotional materials promised to
"protect and promote the[] health" of their subscribers; the plaintiff
paid the HMO directly for the physician's services; the plaintiff was
limited in choice of physician to a list pre-approved by the HMO; the
plaintiff could not see a specialist without HMO approval; and, even
when the plaintiff was allowed to see a specialist, the HMO, not the
plaintiff, chose the specialist. 9 The court concluded that, because the
plaintiff "was required to follow the mandates of [the] HMO ... there
[was] an inference that [the plaintiff] looked to the institution for care
and not solely to the physicians."'-" Similarly, in Petrovich v. Share
Health Plan, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed a suit to proceed
against an IPA model HMO on a vicarious liability by way of
ostensible agency theory because the HMO "promulgated such a
system of control over its physicians that [the HMO] effectively
negated the exercise of their independent medical judgment, to
plaintiff's detriment."35 '
In addition to vicarious liability for the negligent actions of their
physicians, MCOs are also liable for any breach of duty owed directly
to the patient. Courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed directly
against MCOs on a host of theories, including negligent selection and
retention of sub-par physicians,'- negligent denial of care,'" bad faith

34& Id. at 1229.
349. Id. at 1235.
350. Id.; see also Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768NH, 1991 WL 277590. at *4 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 1991) (holding HMO liable under ostensible agency theory for
negligence of contract physician), McClellan v. HMO of Pa.. 604 A.2d 1053. 1056-57
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding plaintiff stated valid cause of action for ostensible
agency liability). But see Chase v. Indep. Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991) (finding there was no ostensible agency because there was no showing
of detrimental reliance).
351. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, 719 N.E.2d 756,760,775 (1999).
352. See Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58. 60 (Mo. 1989) (finding
HMO owed duty to subscribers to investigate competence of physicians and to
exclude those who present foreseeable risk of harm).
353. The leading case in this area is Wickline v. State. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App.
1986). See supra text accompanying notes 298-300. Though the court did not find the
insurance company liable for a denial of treatment decision, in dicta the court wrote:
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care which
should have been provided is not provided should recover for the injuries
suffered from all those responsible for the deprivation of such care,
including, when appropriate, health care payors. Third party payors of
health care services can be held legally accountable when medically
inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation
of cost containment mechanisms as, for example, when appeals made on a
patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or
unreasonably disregarded or overridden.
Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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denial of care,354 bad faith breach of contract or breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing,355 misrepresentation and false
advertising, 3 6 and tortious interference in the physician-patient
relationship." 7 Some large jury verdicts have been returned against
MCOs for denial of care decisions. In Fox v. Health Net, for example,
a California jury awarded $89 million, including $77 million in
punitive damages, to a breast cancer patient who died after the HMO
refused to pay for a bone marrow transplant.

8

Thus, despite the legal obstacles plaintiffs face when they seek to
hold an MCO liable for inadequate care or denial of care, courts have
been increasingly receptive to such lawsuits. Exposure to liability is,
therefore, probably the major deterrent to inappropriate
encroachment by corporate medical providers on a physician's
exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a patient.
V. LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
UNDER CORPORATE MANAGEMENT

If one takes seriously the anecdotal and survey evidence of the legal

profession's failure to meet the needs of middle- and lower-income
clients,359 it has serious implications for the on-going MDP debate. It
not only adds to the arguments for allowing partnerships between
lawyers and other non-lawyer professionals, it raises the corporate
specter that lurks at the edge of the MDP debate-and the "fear of
Sears" that it inspires.
The "ethical" rule that prohibits non-lawyer ownership of legal
services providers, embodied in Model Rule 5.4 and its predecessors,
354. Johnson v. Humana Health Plans, Inc. (Cir. Ct., Jefferson Co., Ky. Oct. 20,
1998), reportedin Nat'l L.J., Nov. 30, 1998, at B6 (awarding $13 million to patient for
bad faith refusal to pay for recommended hysterectomy).
355. See Williams v. HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717, 721 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)
(bad faith failure to inform plaintiff of grievance procedures); Morris v. Health Net,
988 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah 1999) (bad faith failure to reimburse plaintiff for emergency
treatment); McEvoy v. Group Health Cooperative, 570 N.W.2d 397, 407 (Wis. 1997)
(bad faith denial of out-of-network services for anorexia).
356. McClellan v. HMO of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (allowing
suit to proceed alleging HMO promotional materials misrepresented quality of care,
screening of physicians, and freedom of access to specialty care).
357. Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 758, 761 (D.N.H. 1997) (finding
adequate plaintiff's characterization of the physician-patient relationship as
"hopelessly compromised by various undisclosed financial incentives... provide[d]
to... physicians in an effort to reduce expenditures on specialty care services."); see
also Roger N. Braden & Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding
the Evolution-Rebuking the Revolution, 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 675, 691 (1998) (discussing
DeMeurers v. Health Net, Civ. No. 239338 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside Co., Oct. 16,
1993), where an arbitration panel awarded over $1 million for an HMO's intentional
interference with patient-physician relationship).
358. See Walsh, supra note 257, at 231-32 (discussing Fox v. Health Net, Civ. No.
219692 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside Co., Dec. 28, 1993)).
359. See supra Part II.B.

2001]

ETHICS OFMIDDLE-CLASS ACCESS

is, in fact, the anchor of the profession's anticompetitive regulatory
structure. Like the medical profession prior to the FTC decision that
declared its parallel prohibition illegal, the legal profession is
currently insulated from market forces that might otherwise provide
competitive pressure for more affordable legal services. In the case of
the medical profession, where service is provided primarily through
insured plans, the prohibition on corporate ownership resulted in outof-control costs borne largely by employers and the government,
which finance those plans. In the case of the legal profession, it has
meant that needed legal services are simply unavailable in many
circumstances to middle- and lower-income consumers.
Current advances in Internet and computer software technology
would seem to provide unprecedented opportunities for efficient and
affordable delivery of needed services and effective collaboration
among professionals serving clients' related needs. Without lifting the
current prohibitions on capital investment from outside the profession
and resulting structural innovations, those opportunities will likely
remain unfulfilled-at least as they might benefit middle- and lowerincome consumers.
As was true for the medical profession, the ethical prohibition on
non-lawyer ownership of legal services providers is defended as
necessary to protect the "core values" of the profession and preserve
the exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of
clients. If the effect of that ethical rule is, however, that a broad class
of Americans is unable to get needed legal services, one must ask on
whose behalf is that independent professional judgment being
exercised? The answer increasingly seems to be large commercial
interests that are generally well-informed and well-situated to
command the independence and loyalty of the lawyers they employ in
any event.
The strikingly parallel history of the prohibition on nonprofessional ownership in the medical profession is helpful in framing
the issues still faced by the legal profession. It poses starkly, first of
all, the restraint of trade issue. The FTC held in 1979 that medical
ethical rules parallel to those in Model Rule 5.4 and its predecessors
were anticompetitive, illegal restraints on trade.-' The FTC reasoned
forcefully that the medical profession's prohibitions on non-physician
ownership of medical service providers had "deter[red] the offering of
innovative forms of health care delivery" in order to protect the
income of fee-for-service physicians and that "[t]he costs to the public
in terms of less expensive or even, perhaps, more improved forms of
medical care [had been] great. ' 361 The Commission concluded that
physicians were not "entitled to preserve their basic ethical values
360. See supra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
361. In re Am. Med. Ass'n. 94 F.T.C. 701. 917 (1979).
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despite deleterious effects on competition" or to remove themselves
wholly from the marketplace.36 One is hard-pressed to explain why
these conclusions do not apply with equal force to the legal profession
and its prohibition on non-lawyer ownership of legal service
providers.
To the degree that the "state action" doctrine, enunciated by
lawyers sitting as judges, exempts lawyers' ethical rules-though not
doctors' ethical rules-from antitrust scrutiny,363 it would seem to say
more about power than policy. Why should the fact that lawyers'
rules have been ratified by other lawyers, sitting as state supreme
court justices, distinguish them in any meaningful, policy way from
doctors' rules that were not? As their parallel histories demonstrate,
the rules were enacted for the same protectionist purposes in response
to the same threat of corporate competition.
That the legal prohibition on non-professional ownership has not
suffered the same demise as the parallel medical prohibition is
probably attributable in large part to the difference in public
perception of medical and legal services. Most people do not regard
legal services at the same level of necessity as medical care. After all,
what is typically at stake is not life or health but merely property or
legal rights. For perhaps that reason, the government, except for the
criminally accused and, to a limited degree, for those with no
resources, has not engaged in large-scale subsidizing of legal services,
certainly not for the middle-class. As a result, the prohibition on nonlawyer investment in the legal services industry has resulted not in a
cost crisis that threatens government budgets but in unaffordable or
inaccessible services for the middle class.
This gap in services would seem to argue-no less than the cost
crisis in the medical profession-for a serious reexamination of the
prohibition and its justifications. If we are willing to live with and
regulate potential encroachments on professional independence of
judgment in order to control rising costs when health and life itself are
at stake, why are we unwilling to do so to make legal services more
available when only property and legal rights are at stake?
The experience of the medical profession suggests that legitimate
concerns over loss of professional autonomy to the detriment of
clients can be adequately addressed through a combination of ethical
rules and liability deterrents.
While the cost-cutting methods
introduced by corporate medical care managers have resulted in tragic
denials of care in some instances, there is no evidence that the health
care industry is facing a general quality of care crisis, and the
complementary vice of over-treatment and unnecessary procedures
has undoubtedly been reduced. Though imperfect and evolving,
362. Id. at 954.
363. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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attempts in the medical sphere to regulate the loss of professional
autonomy in the corporate era can provide some lessons for how the
same concerns might be addressed in the legal context. Moreover,
because failures to properly exercise professional judgment on behalf
of a civil client will usually result in loss of property rather than loss of
life, those failures should be more tolerable and more remediable in
the legal than in the medical context.
Model Rule 5.4 and its predecessors are prophylactic. By regulating
the ownership structure of legal service providers, they address only
indirectly the justification for their existence: protection of lawyers'
independence of professional judgment. Like the new, corporate era
medical ethics rules, the legal rules of professional conduct could
begin by affirming that value directly rather than indirectly and
making its prohibition a basis for discipline. Lawyers, like physicians,
could be implored to maintain as paramount the interests of their
clients and to exercise their independent judgment despite any
attempts by lay service providers to put limitations on the exercise of
that judgment.
Current Model Rule 5.4(c), directed at the
circumstance where a third party pays the client's legal bills, already
articulates this basic principle: "A lawyer shall not permit a person
who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services
for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering such legal services."'
Model Rule 1.8(f)(2) provides
similarly that "[a] lawyer shall not accept compensation [from a third
person for a representation of the client] unless there is no
interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment
or with the client-lawyer relationship."' - This principle could be
articulated specifically as it applies to lawyers employed by nonlawyer legal service providers.
The legal rules, like the medical rules, could also give lawyers
affirmative duties of information and advocacy in the face of
limitations on service. Lawyers could be given explicit ethical duties
to explain to clients any limitations on service imposed by the service
provider and to advocate on behalf of the client for the higher level of
service. Indeed, lawyers already are obligated under Model Rule

364. Annotated Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.4(c) (1999); cf. Tully v. Edgar,
676 N.E.2d 1361, 1365 (I11.App. 1997) (ruling that because of the "'general duty
applied to all attorneys to work for the best interests of their client, without regard to
who may ultimately be paying their fees," special attorneys general -must exercise
independent judgment in protecting the interests of their state employee clients,

without interference from, or with regard to the views of, the [aittorney [gleneral").
365. R. 1.8(0(2); see also Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 5-107(B) (as
amended and in effect as of 1983), reprinted in ABA, Compendium of Professional
Responsibility Rules and Standards (2001) ("A law\yer shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or
regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services.").
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1.2(c) to obtain informed client consent for any limitations on the
means or objectives of their representation. 66
Beyond what has been required in the medical context, lawyers
could also be required to fully disclose any financial incentives that
they might have for reduction of service to the client and any
contractual duties to the legal services provider that might impinge on
their complete loyalty to the client's needs. Current Model Rule
1.7(b) already provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,

unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.

67

Whenever a lawyer has an interest in the outcome of a matter that
is likely to conflict with his client's interests-whether it be a business,
financial, property, or personal interest-"the lawyer should not
undertake employment without the client's consent, after a full
disclosure of the relevant circumstances and legal risks.' 36 This wellestablished principle could properly be interpreted to require
disclosure of any financial incentive for reduced service resulting from
the lawyer's financial relationship with a legal service provider and the
informed consent of the client to representation despite that incentive.
Perhaps most importantly, lawyers working for a corporate legal
services provider could and should be subject to the same ethical rules
that govern the conduct of all lawyers. There is no reason why the
profession could not demand compliance with those rules and thereby
protect its "core values" in the corporate provider context.

366. Rule 1.2(c) provides that "[a] lawyer may limit the objectives of the
representation if the client consents after consultation." R. 1.2(c). Paragraph 4 in the
official comments to Rule 1.2 explains that "[tihe objectives or scope of services
provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms
under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client.... The terms upon
which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or means." R. 1.2
cmt. 4.
367. R. 1.7(b) (emphasis added).
368. See Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 15.2, at 627
(5th ed. 2000); see, e.g., Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1993) (lawyer
representing plaintiff owed a debt to defendant); Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v.
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1986) (financial interest in corporation to be acquired
by client); Cummings v. Sea Lion Corp., 924 P.2d 1011 (Alaska 1996) (undisclosed
financial interest with other party to transaction); Gonzalez v. Gordon, 233 A.D.2d
191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (undisclosed personal guaranty of loans of party involved
in transaction).
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This would include compliance with the duty of confidentiality as
embodied in Model Rule 1.6, which prohibits a lawyer from
"reveal[ing] information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation."'
Except as necessary to the representation of the client, lawyers
representing clients through corporate providers would not be at
liberty to share confidential client information with other corporate
employees, any more than lawyers are currently free to share
confidences with other law firm employees.-"" They would not be
allowed, without client consent, to share client information with other
corporate employees for the purpose of marketing other corporate
services to the clients.
The conflict of interest rules, embodied in Model Rules 1.7, 1.8, and
1.9, could and should apply without compromise in the corporate
provider context. The rule of imputed disqualification, embodied in
Model Rule 1.10, which disqualifies all members of a firm from
representing a client if any member has a disqualifying conflict'
should take account in the corporate or MDP context of the client
representations, responsibilities, and interests of non-lawyer corporate
employees. A lawyer working for the corporation would thus be
prohibited from representing a client not only when another lawyer in
the corporation would be prevented from representing that client but
whenever a non-lawyer professional or other service provider in the
corporation would be prohibited if the principles of Model Rules 1.7,
1.8, and 1.9 applied to them. Therefore, for example, under Rule 1.7,
a lawyer would not be able to represent a client in a matter adverse to
a financial planning client of the corporation without the informed
consent of both clients.
This rule of imputation could be a major impediment to the ability
of large corporations to take on legal representations, given the
likelihood of resulting conflicts and the difficulties of maintaining an
adequate conflict checking system. Large law firms, some of which
have more than a thousand lawyers in multiple offices, are already
facing this challenge. Corporate legal service providers could and
should have the option, however, of creating a truly separate legal
services division, or subsidiary corporation, to avoid imputation of
conflicts throughout the corporation. Regulation by the profession of
lawyers working for corporate legal service providers should
369. R. 1.6(a).
370. Under Model Rule 5.3, lawyers are responsible for reasonable efforts to
ensure that non-lawyer assistants maintain client confidences to which they are privy

and otherwise conduct themselves in a manner "compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer." R. 5.3(b).
371. Model Rule 1.10(a) provides that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm,
none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any of them practicing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2." R. 1.10(a).
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accommodate corporate structures that truly preserve the professional
values of loyalty and confidentiality that the conflict rules are
designed to protect, but only those that truly do.
Lawyers, like physicians, should and would also continue to be
subject to liability according to the existing standard of care. If
limitations or incentives from the corporate service provider resulted
in a breach of duty and harm to the client, the lawyer could be held
accountable in an action for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty.
While not intended to establish liability standards, the profession's
ethical rules are highly probative of the lawyer's standard of care and
often provide the foundation for such an action.372 A cause of action
could arise against the lawyer if the client was harmed due to a breach
of the ethical rules requiring exercise of independent professional
judgment, failure to inform the client fully of all considerations
affecting his legal rights, or failure to disclose financial incentives or
limitations imposed by the corporate legal service provider.
In addition, MDPs or corporate service providers, like MCOs, could
and should be directly liable for any malpractice committed by
lawyers in their employ under the doctrine of respondeat superior.373
If lawyers work for corporate service providers as independent
contractors, the doctrine of ostensible agency, as in the case of
MCOs,374 should apply whenever the client reasonably believes that

the lawyer is an agent of the corporation. If existing agency doctrine
is not sufficient, legal service providers could be made responsible by
statute, as a condition of licensing, for the malpractice of any lawyer
over whom they exerted significant control or from whose services
they profited directly.
A regime of this kind does not require excessive imagination. It
would be similar in many ways to what we now have in one area
where middle-class consumers typically do have access to legal
representation-under liability insurance policies in which the insurer
agrees to defend the insured against claims by third parties. As would
be the case in the proposed regime of corporate legal service
providers, counsel hired by insurance companies to defend
policyholders must exercise their independent professional judgment
on behalf of the client despite the sometimes conflicting interests of
the company that employs them.375 While the lawyer's ethical duties
372. The "Scope" preamble to the Model Rules states that "[t]hey are not designed
to be a basis for civil liability." Annotated Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl., at
xvii (1999). They are, however, routinely relied on to establish a standard of care in
cases asserting claims against lawyers for breach of their professional duties. See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 1.1:201, at 1013 (Supp. 1997); see, e.g., Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 332-43.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 344-51.
375. The process has been described as follows:
Under the terms of a typical liability policy, the insurer agrees in return for
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are owed to the insured, who is her client, defense counsel typically

have a close relationship with the insurance company and a financial
interest in serving the company's interests." 6

Lawyers who do

insurance defense work often receive a substantial percentage or even
all of their work from an insurer with whom they have an ongoing
relationship. Indeed, some insurers choose to handle defense of
insureds with their own employees-salaried, in-house counsel.This de facto exception to the prohibition on corporate legal service
providers has been approved against ethical challenges by the
majority of courts that have faced the issue.7
The circumstance of the insurance defense counsel is, therefore, not
unlike the hypothetical circumstance of a lawyer employed by a
corporate legal service provider (or a doctor employed by an MCO).
She has an ethical duty of loyalty to the client and a duty to exercise
her independent professional judgment in the service of the client's
best interests, despite possibly conflicting duties to her corporate
payment of premiums to provide the insured: 1)indemnity up to policy
limits against liability incurred for covered conduct and 2) defense against
claims of such liability. Policies typically but not always give the company
the right to choose defense counsel and to control the defense. A run-ofthe-mill case-one in which the alleged liability is clearly covered within the
policy limit and the insured's interest in the defense is solely economic-will
proceed without conflict. The insurance company is, in effect, the true party
in interest. Only the insurance company's money is at stake in the litigation,
and the insured is content to have the insurance company conduct the
defense as it sees fit.
Not uncommonly, however, the interests of the insurer and the insured
diverge for one or more reasons, including: 1) the complaint alleges some
conduct that is covered and some that is not covered; 2) the plaintiff seeks
damages beyond the amount covered by the policy; or 3) the insured has
non-economic reasons for avoiding any apparent admission of negligence or
wrongdoing.... Choices in the conduct of the defense may, therefore,
benefit one at the expense of the other.
George C. Harris et al., Navigating the Insurance Triangle, ch. 3. at TM-1, in
Litigation Ethics: Course Materials for Continuing Legal Education (John Q. Barrett
& Bruce A. Green eds., 2000). Particularly if the insurer is obligated to provide a
defense to the insured without regard to the cost of that defense, the insurer will be
interested in controlling the costs of defense whereas the insured will prefer that the
defense lawyer do everything possible on her behalf.
376. See Mallen & Smith, supra note 368, § 29.3. at 215 ("The attorney's
relationship with the insurer usually is ongoing, supported by a financial interest in
future assignments and, like other long-term relationships. sometimes strengthened
by real friendship.").
377. See Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 28.5. at 498
(4th ed. 1996) ("There has been a noticeable increase by insurers in the use of salaried
counsel to defend their insureds.").
378. Courts in nine of eleven states that have faced this issue have found it
permissible for insurers to defend insureds with in-house counsel. See, e.g., Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151,155 (Ind. 1999) ("[Alttorneys who are employees of
insurance companies do not necessarily trigger an impermissible conflict ... when
they appear as counsel to defend claims against the companies' policyholders."); see
also Petition of Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1995) (finding it is not a per se
ethical violation for in-house insurance company counsel to represent policyholders).
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employer or financial incentives to do less than all for the client. We
choose, however, not to prohibit this arrangement but to regulate it
for a simple reason: if we did not allow insurance for the costs of
defense, few tort defendants would be able to afford a lawyer. Living
with the ethical tension created by the "insurance triangle" of lawyerclient-insurance company is preferable to the alternative:
no
professional representation for tort defendants. 79
As could be the case in a regime of corporate legal service
providers, this ethical tension is regulated in part by ethical rules that
guide the lawyer's conduct and, most significantly, by liability rules
that compensate clients whose interests are not protected and deter
insurance companies from disregarding those interests. While most
courts have regarded the insurance company as a "dual client," " the
prevailing general principle is that when the interests of the insurer
and insured diverge, the lawyer's paramount duty is to the "primary"
client, the insured. 8' Similarly, a lawyer employed by a corporate
service provider would still owe a paramount duty of loyalty to the
client.
The insurance industry has undertaken cost containment measures
in the legal defense area directly parallel to those undertaken by
MCOs. Just as MCOs attempt to control costs of treatment, many
insurers employ some form of guidelines to control the conduct of the
defense of insureds by outside counsel. An insurer may, for example,
require advance approval for any substantial defense efforts, such as
depositions, motions, legal research projects, or retention of expert
witnesses.
In response to this practice, bar ethics committees have issued
opinions holding that a lawyer's ethical duties to the client take
379. We tolerate a similar ethical tension for the same reason in allowing advocacy
groups to represent individual clients pro bono. As Professor Wolfram has explained,
in discussing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963):
The strong ideological interest of an advocacy organization can plainly
create a risk that the organization's lawyer will not represent sponsored
clients with totally free and independent professional judgment.
Nonetheless, if that risk is not incurred, no representation ... would result.
The Court apparently deems the latter less acceptable than the former.
Wolfram, supra note 64, at 447.
380. Most, but not all, courts regard the insurance triangle as a circumstance of
dual representation, with defense counsel owing attorney-client loyalties to the
insurer as well as the insured. See Mallen & Smith, supra note 368, § 29.3; Douglas R.
Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics, 475,482 n.26 (1996).
381. See, e.g., Am. Cas. Co. v. O'Flaherty, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1070, 1076 (1997)
(holding that insurer has a right as client to sue defense counsel for malpractice but
only where there is no conflict between insurer and insured because "the attorney's
primary loyalty must be to the insured it was retained to defend"); Siebert Oxidermo,
Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332, 341 (Ind. 1983); Mallen & Smith, supra note 368, §
29.3, at 217 n.14 (discussing cases that held a lawyer's paramount duty is to the
insured when interests between insured and insurer diverge).
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precedence over her contractual duties to the insurance company.

Reminiscent of medical ethics guidelines for physicians who operate
in the managed care regime, a recent opinion of the ABA Ethics

Committee held that "[a] lawyer must not permit compliance with
'guidelines' and other directives of an insurer relating to the lawyer's
services to impair materially the lawyer's independent professional
judgment in representing an insured." - The propriety of insurer
guidelines to insurance defense counsel has also been addressed in
numerous recent state bar ethics opinions.' An Indiana bar opinion,
for example, held that "if the negotiated financial terms [of the
contract between the insurance carrier and defense counsel] result in a
material disincentive to perform those tasks which, in the lawyer's
professional judgment, are not reasonable and necessary to the
defense of the insured, such provisions are ethically unacceptable." ' '
While it found "no bright-line test as to the kinds of controls to which
insurance defense counsel may agree," it referred counsel to an
existing standard provided by Rule 5.4(c) and held that "[w]hen
confronted by proposed guidelines which cannot be followed
ethically," the lawyer must seek "an acceptable modification" or
decline the representation.3"

Other state ethics opinions have

emphasized full disclosure to the insured of any limitations on
representation.3 86

382. ABA Formal Op. 01-421 (Feb. 16, 2001), LEXIS, ABA Formal Ethics
Opinions.
383. See Ala. Ethics Op. RO-98--02 (1998), reprintedin Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics
(2001); Colorado Formal Ethics Op. 107 (1999), available at http.//www.cobar.org
comms/ethics/fo/fo_107.htm; Fla. Bar Staff Ethics Op. 20591 (1997), reprinted in Trial
Advoc. Q., Winter 1998, at 7; Ind. Ethics Op. No. 3 of 1998, reprinted in [1998
Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics: Iowa Ethics Op. 99-1 (1999), reprinted
in [2000 Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics; Ky. Bar Ass'n. E-331 (1988);
Mass. Op. No. 00-4 (2000), available at LEXIS, National Reporter on Legal Ethics
and Prof. Responsibility-MA Opinions; Mo. Bar Informal Op. 980124 (1998),
available at http://hww.mobar.net/opinions/: Ohio Op. 2000-3 (2000). available at
2000 WL 1005223; R.I. Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel Op. No. 99-18 (1999),
available at LEXIS, National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Prof. Responsibility - RI
Opinions; Tenn. Formal Ethics Op. 2000-F-145, available at 2000 WL 1687507; Tex.
Ethics Op. 533 (2000), available at 2000 WL 987291; Vt. Op. No. 98-7 (1998),
reprintedin [2000 Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics; Va. Leo 1723 (1998),
availableat Westlaw, VA LE Op. No. 1723; Wash. Formal Op. 195 (1999), reprintedin
Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics (2001).
384. Ind. Ethics Op. No. 3 of 1998, reprinted in [1998 Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep.
on Legal Ethics.
385. Id.
386. For example, see Virginia Leo 1723, which states:
[T]he attorney/client relationship must remain free from undue influence
from third parties, such as the insurance carrier .., it is ethically
impermissible for an attorney to agree to an insurance carrier's restrictions
on the attorney's representation of the insured absent full disclosure and
consent of the client at the outset of the representation and absent a
determination that the client's rights will not be materially impaired by the
restrictions.
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Recent court opinions have also addressed the conflict between
insurers' attempts to control costs and lawyers' ethical duties to
clients. The Montana Supreme Court, in In re Rules of Professional
Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures,38 ruled
on the propriety of insurer billing guidelines in an action for
declaratory relief brought by insurance defense counsel. 3m The court
held that guidelines requiring prior approval for defense activities
such as scheduling depositions, conducting research, employing
experts, and preparing motions, "fundamentally interfere[] with
defense counsels' exercise of their independent judgment, as required
by [Model] Rule 1.8(f)" and that "defense counsel in Montana who
submit to the requirement of prior approval violate their duties under
the Rules of Professional Conduct to exercise their independent
judgment and to give their undivided loyalty to insureds. 38 9 Similar
principles could apply to the ethical duties of a lawyer employed by a
corporate legal services provider, just as they apply to physicians
employed by MCOs.
Existing principles of liability law that govern the duties of
insurance defense counsel and insurance companies to their insureds
also provide a useful analogy for the role that liability could serve in
correcting any encroachments by corporate legal service providers on
the attorney-client relationship. Just as "the MCO made me do it" is
no defense to medical malpractice, 3" the claim that defense counsel
was following the directives of the insurance company that engaged
her is no defense to a legal malpractice action. 39' Additionally, like
MCOs with respect to physician negligence, insurance companies can
be held vicariously liable in most jurisdictions for the negligence of
defense counsel that they hire.3" Most significantly, just as MCOs
Va. Leo 1723 (1998), availableat Westlaw, VA LE Op. No. 1723.
387. 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000). The case was vigorously defended by several major
insurance companies and provoked numerous briefs by amici. See id. at 807.
388. See also Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998). The court in Dynamic Concepts stated:
Under no circumstances can [insurers' outside counsel guidelines] be
permitted to impede the attorney's own professional judgment about how
best to competently represent the insureds. If the attorney's representation
is to be limited in any way that unreasonably interferes with the defense, it is
the insured, not the insurer, who should make that decision.
Id. at 889 n.9; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 634
(Tex. 1998) (Gonzalez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am concerned
that defense lawyers may be reluctant to resist cost-cutting measures that
detrimentally affect the quality of the insured's defense. There is a real risk that these
efforts at cost containment compromise a lawyer's autonomy and independent
judgment on the best means for defending an insured.").
389. Rules of Profl Conduct, 2 P.3d at 815, 817.
390. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
391. See, e.g., Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 90 Haw. 39, 54 (1999)
(holding that insurance defense counsel who followed insurer directives could be
liable for malpractice for breach of duty of independent judgment).
392. See, e.g., Boyd Bros. Transp. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 1407,
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owe duties directly to their subscribers, there is a well-developed body
of case law establishing fiduciary duties owed by the insurance
company directly to the insured. If an insurance company pursues its
own interest in cost savings and resulting profit to the detriment of the
insured, such as by unreasonably failing to settle a claim within policy
limits, the insured can sue the company for "bad faith. 393 The
prospect of a bad faith action, which often includes a claim for
punitive damages, is a powerful deterrent to any conduct by the
insurer that compromises the insured's rights or interests. Corporate
legal service providers, like insurers and MCOs, would owe fiduciary
duties directly to those clients who sought their services. There is no
reason why they would not be directly responsible for any breach of
those duties that resulted in harm to the client.
In an ideal world, lawyers (and doctors and other professionals)
would be free to employ their professional skill and training on behalf
of clients to the fullest extent without cost constraints and without
interference from non-professionals. We live, however, in a world of
scarce resources and allocation decisions.
The cost of
uncompromising ethical rules, such as the current prohibition on nonlawyer ownership of legal service providers, may be a restraint of
trade that prices legal services out of the range of low- and middleincome consumers. As the medical profession has learned, it may be
necessary to live with the ethical tension of encroachments on
professional autonomy in order to make professional services
accessible to a wider class of society.

1410-11 (11th Cir. 1984) (observing that vicarious liability is the majority rule); Smoot
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525, 530 (5th Cir. 1962) (-Those whom
the Insurer selects to execute its promises, whether attorneys, physicians, no less than
company-employed adjusters, are its agents for whom it has the customary legal
liability."); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. P.B. Hoidale Co., 789 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Kan.
1992); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980);
Stumpf v. Continental Cas. Co., 794 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (-[WIe apply
what appears to be the rule in the majority of jurisdictions: An insurer may be
vicariously liable for the actions of its agents, including counsel that it hires to defend
its insured."). But see Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 527 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1973) ("[Riemedy for this negligence is found in an action against counsel for
malpractice and not in a suit against counsel's employer to impose vicarious
liability."); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 629 (Tex. 1998)
(holding that insurer may not be vicariously liable for malpractice of independent
attorney whom it chooses to defend insured).
393. See generally Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions: Liability and Damages
(2d ed. 1997).
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